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Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. 
In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, 
enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. 
Patent law, on the other hand, is enforced almost exclusively through private 
lawsuits. Considering patent law’s constitutionally mandated public purpose—
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”—this privatization of 
patent enforcement is troubling. 
In recent years, there has been some movement away from this purely private 
enforcement scheme for patent law. The Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission, for example, have involved themselves in certain patent 
matters that implicate antitrust law. Although this is a step in the right direction, 
these regulators alone cannot adequately enforce patent law due to their limited 
jurisdiction, resources, and expertise. 
This Article thus proposes a robust public enforcement regime for patent law. 
It argues that Congress should arm the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”), the agency responsible for reviewing patents ex ante, with broad 
powers to police patent validity ex post. The PTO is best situated to lead this 
effort because of the agency’s expertise, institutional resources, and enhanced 
powers under the America Invents Act. Moreover, charging the PTO with the 
responsibility for policing patents should serve to dispel allegations of agency 
capture and institutional bias toward patent owners.  
INTRODUCTION 
Not long ago, the standing of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as 
the most powerful and influential institution in patent law was indubitable. These 
days, however, it seems like everyone wants a piece of the patent action. In 
recent years, the Supreme Court, Congress, the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”), the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”), state attorneys general, federal district courts, state courts, and 
even the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules have all asserted power over 
patent-related matters to some degree.1 The result is a new era in patent law’s 
 
1 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 519 (2010) (“The innovative jurisdictional structure of the new 
appellate court . . . has, in a subtle but meaningful way, shifted power over the development 
of patent law from the judicial to the executive branch of government.”); Arti K. Rai, Patent 
Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 1237, 1238-40 (2012) (“[T]he institutional debate has often focused on the Federal 
Circuit. . . . But other institutions are also beginning to compete for institutional primacy.”). 
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history marked by power struggles and political wrangling among these 
lawmaking bodies. 
Many factors have contributed to this move toward decentralization—and, 
arguably, destabilization—of the patent system. First, as patent rights have 
become increasingly important to the economy, stakeholder groups have 
expanded causing a broad array of institutional actors to engage with patent 
issues.2 Second, while acknowledging the importance of high-quality patents, 
accused infringers have been complaining about the impact of bad patents, 
patent trolls, and frivolous infringement suits for more than a decade now.3 
When efforts to reform the system met resistance at the Federal Circuit, accused 
infringers turned elsewhere for help.4 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
when Congress passed the 2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”),5 it radically 
altered the power dynamic in patent law by providing the PTO with a host of 
new responsibilities and powers.6 
Prior to the AIA, the Federal Circuit dominated patent policy vis-à-vis the 
PTO.7 This was due in large part to the Federal Circuit’s determination that the 
PTO lacked substantive rulemaking authority and its refusal to afford deference 
to PTO legal interpretations.8 A number of commentators criticized the Federal 
 
2 See Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1965, 1966 (2009) (“[L]acking institutional competition from other courts, the Federal 
Circuit has strengthened patent law. In the process, the court has made this a more attractive 
area for institutions to wield legal and policy influence.”). 
3 See Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 
1444 (2014) (discussing how the patent litigation landscape is changing because of patent 
trolls); Long, supra note 2, at 1966. 
4 Long, supra note 2, at 1966 (“The more prominent role played by the PTO is both a cause 
and an effect of dissatisfaction with the state of patent law.”). 
5 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
6 See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 647-50 (2012) (“By granting 
the Patent Office the power to set standards, prioritize technologies, and set its own fees, 
Congress has pumped up the [PTO]’s rulemaking muscles and invited it to flex them.”); 
Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1964 (2013) (“The AIA . . . undeniably increased the stature 
of the PTO by granting the Agency a host of new responsibilities, such as fee-setting authority 
and the ability to conduct new adjudicatory proceedings in which patent rights may be 
obtained or challenged.” (footnote omitted)). 
7 Rai, supra note 1, at 1238 (“Congress has . . . delegated responsibility for interpreting 
the [Patent Act of 1952] to the [PTO] and the courts—with a historical emphasis on the 
courts.”). 
8 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—authorizes the Commissioner 
to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does 
NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.” (quoting Animal Legal 
Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). 
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Circuit’s approach, arguing that it contradicts mainstream administrative law 
principles, marginalizes the PTO, and undermines the development of sound 
patent policy.9 Moreover, in the years leading up to the passage of the AIA, the 
executive branch urged Congress to grant the PTO substantive rulemaking 
authority.10 Indeed, such a provision made its way into at least one early version 
of the legislation.11 
In the end, the AIA did not include an explicit provision regarding the PTO’s 
substantive rulemaking authority.12 Yet, the legislation has effected a major 
power shift in the patent system nonetheless. Not only does the AIA endow the 
PTO with fee-setting authority,13 it also empowers the agency to decide matters 
of patent validity in various post-grant adjudicatory proceedings.14 These 
 
9 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1798-
99 (2011); John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. 1041, 1075 (2011); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 
278-79; Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 31, 35 (2011). 
10 Letter from Gary Locke, Sec’y of Commerce, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, to Senators 
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, and Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Ranking 
Member, Comm. on the Judiciary 2-3 (Oct. 5, 2009) (on file with author) (“Current law limits 
the USPTO Director’s ability to implement needed reforms through the promulgation of 
administrative regulations. . . . At a minimum, USPTO should have procedural rulemaking 
authority over proceedings in the agency.”). 
11 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 11 (2007) (“[T]he Director may 
promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders that the Director determines appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title or any other law applicable to the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office or that the Director determines necessary to govern the operation and 
organization of the Office.”). 
12 Rai, supra note 1, at 1239 (“Although the AIA did not give the agency the expansive 
rulemaking authority over questions of substantive patent law that had been proposed in 
earlier versions of the legislation, the AIA did confer upon the PTO the ability to conduct 
post-grant review proceedings that resemble formal adjudications.”). Notably, however, the 
Supreme Court recently held in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2144 (2016), that the AIA grants the PTO substantive rulemaking authority, at least with 
respect to post-grant proceedings, and that such rules are entitled to deference under Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012 & Supp. 2012). 
14 Id. §§ 311-319, 321-329 (describing inter partes review and post-grant review 
proceedings); id. § 321 (describing transitional program for covered business-method 
patents). Melissa Wasserman has argued that the AIA indirectly granted the PTO substantive 
rulemaking authority through these proceedings. Wasserman, supra note 6, at 1967. She 
believes that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s validity decisions will be entitled to Chevron 
deference because of the formal adjudicatory nature of the proceedings. Id. If correct, this 
means that the PTO, not the Federal Circuit, is now the “chief expositor of substantive patent 
law standards.” Id. at 1965. So far, however, the PTO has failed to ask for Chevron deference 
on legal determinations made in adjudication. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, 
Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1581-90 (2016) 
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proceedings, conducted by the newly created Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB”), have begun to redefine the PTO. 
The PTO, which is responsible for granting patents, has long been plagued 
with a reputation as a weak and ineffectual agency. Critics claim, among other 
things, that the PTO’s fee structures and internal operating procedures bias the 
agency toward granting patents.15 More pointedly, the agency has been accused 
of kowtowing to the patent bar—the group that the PTO is supposed to be 
regulating—and blamed for flooding the marketplace with bad patents.16 Indeed, 
these concerns about agency capture and incompetence helped spur the reform 
efforts that culminated in the AIA.17 
The AIA, and its creation of the PTAB in particular, have ushered in a new 
era in the PTO’s history. Where the PTO was once viewed as a weak, captured 
agency whose sole purpose was to serve its “customers”—i.e., patent 
applicants—today’s PTO, like so many modern federal agencies, is 
multifunctional. Agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and the FTC consist 
of various offices or arms that perform wide-ranging functions in furtherance of 
the agency’s mission.18 With the creation of the PTAB and formal adjudicatory 
proceedings, the PTO is beginning to look more like these other agencies. From 
an institutional choice perspective, this is a positive development that better 
positions the PTO to effectuate patent law’s constitutionally mandated purpose: 
the promotion of innovation for the public good.19 
 
(“[T]he PTO has sought to assert significant authority under the auspices of the AIA. This 
assertion of authority has sometimes included taking a leadership position on the legal 
standards that determine patent validity. So it might seem obvious that the PTO would argue 
for Chevron deference on these positions. But it has not so argued.”). 
15 E.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect 
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. 67, 124 (2013) (“Our findings suggest that the PTO’s current fee schedule likely biases 
the Agency to grant patents.”); Long, supra note 2, at 1990-91 (“At the level of substantive 
patent policy, the PTO’s budgetary structure creates a bias in favor of granting patents and 
encouraging inventors to apply for patents.”). 
16 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 15, at 74 (noting “a general perception in the literature 
that the PTO is routinely granting bad patents”); Jonathan S. Masur, Response, The PTO’s 
Future: Reform or Abolition?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 2 (2009) (“Through a 
combination of poorly designed incentives, a lack of necessary funding, and a type of capture 
by the patent bar, the PTO has come to be viewed as inept and inefficient.”). 
17 Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 
Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 
621 (2015). 
18 See, e.g., Terry Calvani & Angela M. Diveley, The FTC at 100: A Modest Proposal for 
Change, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1169, 1183-84 (2014) (discussing the prosecutorial and 
adjudicatory functions of the SEC and the FTC). 
19 See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 739 (1989) (“[O]ne central premise of our post-
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Yet, one fundamental way that the PTO stands apart from these other agencies 
is that it lacks an enforcement—or prosecutorial—arm to police patents ex 
post.20 While the PTO enforces patent validity ex ante, no federal agency 
monitors, investigates, and polices already-issued patents. Outside of the 
antitrust context,21 there simply are no public enforcement actions concerning 
patents. The government has instead delegated to private parties the authority to 
enforce patent validity. Such wholesale reliance on private litigation raises a host 
of problems. 
As I have argued in earlier work, patent validity is a matter of public law.22 
Of course, it is common for public law regimes to rely on private enforcement.23 
But in the areas of securities, environmental, and antitrust law, private 
enforcement is merely a supplement to agency enforcement.24 In the patent 
 
New Deal administrative law system . . . is that the administrative agency as the delegatee of 
congressional authority, rather than the Article III courts, is the primary policymaker under 
the statute.”); Rai, supra note 1, at 1265-72 (discussing “the comparative competence of 
particular patent institutions,” namely Congress, the federal courts, and the PTO); 
Wasserman, supra note 6, at 2007-18 (noting that “the principal goal of the patent system” is 
“the promotion of innovation,” and comparing “the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
Federal Circuit and the PTO”). 
20 See infra Section II.A (discussing the development of the United States patent review 
system). 
21 See, e.g., Susan E. Foster, Intellectual Property Antitrust: The Pendulum Swings, in 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW (ASPATORE 2013), 2013 WL 3773857, at *5 (“In 
the context of intellectual property antitrust, both the FTC and the DOJ have been fairly active 
in assessing antitrust settlement activities, patent portfolio acquisitions, and the activities of 
patent assertion entities (PAEs).”). 
22 Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 52 (2012) 
(“[P]atent validity disputes bear little resemblance to private law litigation.”). Some scholars 
contend that patent infringement is also a public law right. See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent 
Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 531 (2014) (arguing that all patent 
rights, including the right to sue for infringement, “stand in stark contrast to traditional private 
law rights”). The question of whether infringement is a public offense that should be subject 
to government enforcement is an excellent one. It is beyond the scope of this Article, which 
focuses on validity, but has been addressed in other work. See Caroline M. Turner, A Path 
Toward an Increased Role for the United States in Patent Infringement Litigation, 14 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 485, 489 (2015) (discussing the ways in which government could bring 
infringement suits on behalf of certain private parties). 
23 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1284 (1976) (“Perhaps the dominating characteristic of modern federal litigation is that 
lawsuits do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private rights. Instead, the 
object of litigation is the vindication of constitutional or statutory policies. . . . For this 
reason . . . I shall call the emerging model ‘public law litigation.’”). 
24 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) (explaining that in 
securities law, private enforcement is a “necessary supplement” to SEC actions “because of 
practical limitations upon the [agency’s] enforcement capabilities” (quoting J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))). 
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context, by contrast, the public is wholly reliant on private actors to police 
invalid patents, either through declaratory judgment actions in federal court or 
administrative review at the PTO.25 Unfortunately for the public, private actors 
are generally disinclined to challenge bad patents.26 
The disincentives for private validity challenges are well documented in the 
literature. Often private parties are discouraged from challenging a patent 
because of the “free rider problem,”27 whereby the patent challenger bears all 
the cost of litigation, but the benefit—invalidation of the patent—is enjoyed by 
all, including the challenger’s competitors.28 Additionally, competitors are 
usually best situated to contest patents, but they may worry about putting their 
own, similar intellectual property at risk.29 Finally, whenever a private party 
launches a validity challenge, there’s a real risk that the patent owner will 
countersue for infringement.30 Private parties, therefore, are loath to initiate 
patent challenges in most situations. 
For a time, it appeared that public interest organizations might help fill this 
enforcement gap in the patent system. The ACLU, the Public Patent Foundation, 
and Consumer Watchdog have all attempted to intervene on the public’s behalf 
to challenge suspect patents in recent years.31 These efforts have mostly been 
unsuccessful, however, because of the Federal Circuit’s overly restrictive 
standing doctrine in patent cases.32 And while public interest groups may 
challenge patents at the PTO, the Federal Circuit recently dismissed Consumer 
 
25 See infra Part II (discussing private enforcement of patent validity). 
26 See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 22, at 64-68. 
27 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952, 958 (2004); Joseph S. Miller, 
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 667, 687-88 (2004) (“[T]he . . . free rider problem, which discourages patent 
challenges, is at least as stark as the one that justifies providing a patent system in the first 
place.”). 
28 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 793-97 (2002) (advocating for one-way fee shifting because the 
current rule “might deter private litigants from bringing a costly [patent validity 
challenge] . . . even though the total benefits to society outweighs the cost to the individual”). 
29 La Belle, supra note 22, at 64. 
30 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 21-
22. 
31 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 
(2013); Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1260 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
32 Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
498, 500 (2015) (“[I]n recent years the Federal Circuit has developed a set of standing rules 
that prevents most developers of intellectual property, rather than real property, from bringing 
[quiet title] action[s].”). 
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Watchdog’s appeal from an unfavorable PTO decision for lack of Article III 
standing.33 So even though public interest organizations may have the incentive 
to challenge bad patents, they face serious legal and practical constraints. 
This Article thus argues for a robust public enforcement regime for patent 
law. The recent tumult within our patent system suggests the need for sound 
policymaking, and the ability to police already-issued patents is an important 
part of that effort. Not only should there be public enforcement of patent validity 
for pragmatic reasons (i.e., because private parties and public interest groups are 
unwilling or unable to successfully challenge bad patents), but public 
enforcement is also normatively justified because enforcement decisions shape 
innovation policy for the future. The relatively recent decision in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International34 demonstrates this point well. Alice, which addressed 
the patentability of software inventions, has undoubtedly impacted innovation 
policy. Yet, neither the PTO nor any other agency decided to challenge the 
patent at issue in Alice. Rather, it was CLS Bank—a private party that is much 
more concerned with its personal interests than national innovation policy—that 
made the decision.35 
So, if a public agency should be policing patents ex post, which agency should 
it be? The FTC is one contender given its consumer protection mission and 
experience with antitrust-related patent matters.36 The DOJ’s Antitrust Division 
and Intellectual Property Section have also weighed in on patent issues, so they 
could be in the running too. While these possibilities have some theoretical 
appeal, the PTO nevertheless emerges as the most realistic candidate to lead this 
effort. The PTO, first and foremost, possesses the necessary expertise due to its 
technological acumen and fluency in substantive patent law.37 The PTO also has 
certain mechanisms in place that would facilitate sound enforcement decision-
making, including the Offices of the Chief Economist and Solicitor. Moreover, 
the PTO already has the power, albeit limited and rarely exercised, to challenge 
patents ex post in the form of director-initiated reexaminations.38 And finally, 
 
33 Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1259-60 (“Because Consumer Watchdog has not 
established an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing, however, this court 
dismisses the appeal.”). 
34 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
35 See Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms: Models Without Meaning, 29 
B.C. L. REV. 291, 341 (1988) (“Because private litigants pursue their own interests, even when 
litigating a public law suit, courts have not presumed that private litigants adequately 
represent others similarly situated.”). 
36 See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1206 (2008) 
(discussing “recent requirements for notification of patent settlements to the FTC”). 
37 E.g., R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure 
of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 210 (2002). 
38 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (“On his own initiative, and any time, the Director may 
determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and 
publications discovered by him or cited under the provisions of section 301 or 302.”); 37 
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granting the PTO enforcement power will facilitate the agency’s transformation 
into a legitimate patent policymaker. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I discusses public and private 
enforcement regimes, and weighs the costs and benefits of both. Part II turns to 
patents and our system for enforcing patent validity ex ante and ex post, meaning 
before and after patents are granted, respectively. Part II then outlines some of 
the patent-specific problems associated with private enforcement actions. Part 
III explores why there is no ex post public enforcement of patent validity, and 
argues that such a mechanism is both theoretically and practically important to 
innovation policy. Part III therefore proposes that Congress grant the PTO robust 
powers to regulate patent validity for already-issued patents. 
I. PUBLIC-PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT REGIMES 
Law enforcement in the modern regulatory state is largely a joint enterprise. 
In areas such as securities, antitrust, civil rights, and environmental law, 
enforcement responsibilities are allocated between public and private actors. A 
rich scholarly literature has developed over the past several decades regarding 
the costs and benefits of public and private enforcement regimes,39 and more 
recent scholarship focuses on the intersection and coordination of the two.40 This 
 
C.F.R. § 1.520 (2016) (“The Director may initiate ex parte reexamination without a request 
for reexamination . . . .”). 
39 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 20 (2009) (arguing that “[o]nce one critically 
examines the modern class action . . . one is forced to recognize the substantial need for 
dramatic alteration in the procedure’s underlying theory, modern format, and current doctrinal 
structure”); Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1974) (discussing the possibility of 
“let[ting] anyone enforce statutes and receive as compensation for performance the fines 
levied against convicted violators”); Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform 
Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (discussing “the possibility of constructing a constitutionally sound 
model that harnesses the power of private citizens to reform unconstitutional practices”); 
Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical 
Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (suggesting that it “would be [beneficial] to 
consolidate the enforcement authority now shared between federal regulators, state regulators, 
and class action lawyers in a federal agency, such as the SEC, and to grant that agency 
exclusive authority to prosecute national securities frauds”). 
40 See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 285, 289-90 (2016) (“Redundant public-private enforcement describes legal regimes in 
which public and private agents may seek overlapping remedies for the same conduct on 
substantially similar theories.”); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation 
Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 623 (2013) (“[M]any of our most consequential regulatory 
regimes have evolved in recent decades into hybrids of public and private enforcement . . . .”); 
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 
857 (2014) (discussing how “financial incentives . . . bring[] public enforcement closer to the 
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debate about institutional design informs how effective regulation—including 
the regulation of patents—is best achieved. 
A. Public Enforcement 
One of the most fundamental tenets of our constitutional system is that the 
President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”41 It is the 
executive branch’s job, in other words, to enforce the laws that Congress 
makes.42 The Executive generally carries out this responsibility through the DOJ 
and other administrative agencies.43 These agencies bring enforcement actions 
against violators on the public’s behalf and seek criminal sanctions, injunctive 
relief, or monetary damages.44 Examples include the SEC’s enforcement action 
against Bernard Madoff,45 the DOJ Antitrust Division’s suit against Microsoft,46 
and the EPA’s punishment of British Petroleum for the oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico.47 
This constitutional ideal of regulatory enforcement is normatively attractive 
for many reasons. Public enforcement actions can simultaneously 
“vindicate . . . broadly dispersed rights . . . and . . . exert a measure of deterrence 
for the future.”48 Agencies have specialized knowledge and experience that 
inform and guide enforcement decisions.49 Regulators are well positioned to 
 
private model”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The 
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95 (2005). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
42 See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1867, 1895 (2005) (“[T]he executive branch subsequently ‘execute[s]’ the laws made by 
Congress . . . .”). 
43 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 
(2013) (describing “[t]he growth of the administrative state and the expansion of presidential 
power” in the twentieth century); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) (“We live today in an era of presidential administration.”); Michael 
Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 451-52 (2007) 
(“Most public enforcement officials are essentially administrative agencies.”). 
44 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 777, 799 (1987) (“The Justice Department may seek (1) criminal 
sanctions for violations of the Sherman Act; (2) actual damages for injury sustained by reason 
of any violation of the antitrust laws; and (3) injunctive relief.” (footnotes omitted)). 
45 Diana B. Henriques & Zachery Kouwe, U.S. Arrests a Top Trader in Vast Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A1. 
46 Steve Lohr, Microsoft Case May Be Prelude to a Wider Antitrust Battle, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 9, 1998, at D1. 
47 See Clifford Krauss, U.S. Agrees to Allow BP Back into Gulf Waters to Seek Oil, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2014, at A1. 
48 Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield 
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 604 (2008). 
49 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (noting that agency enforcement 
decisions are “peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise”); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. 
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plan for coordinated enforcement efforts when necessary.50 And perhaps most 
importantly, administrative actors are politically accountable for their 
enforcement decisions. More precisely, the public will hold the President and 
Congress responsible for how agencies exercise their delegated powers, 
including choices about enforcement.51 Dissatisfied voters will consequently 
refuse to re-elect those officials, or so the theory goes.52 
Unfortunately, there are considerable gaps between the ideal of regulatory 
enforcement and the reality. Resource-strapped agencies must set priorities, 
including with respect to enforcement decisions.53 Limited resources might 
force regulators to choose between legitimate tasks, say rulemaking and 
enforcement, because they cannot afford to undertake both.54 In short, “[t]he 
budget and manpower of federal regulatory agencies are” finite, which means 
that some violations will go unenforced.55 
Then there’s the problem of “agency slack”—the tendency of government 
regulators to eschew the public interest by underenforcing or overenforcing 
certain laws.56 The cause of agency slack varies, but regulatory capture is the 
main culprit. Capture is a complicated phenomenon that has been discussed at 
length in the literature.57 In simplest terms, it refers to the situation where 
 
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1211 (1982) 
(discussing courts that “acknowledge the value of an agency’s specialized experience, 
political accountability, and capacity to plan for coordinated enforcement”). 
50 See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1211. 
51 Id. at 1199 (“[A]gency choices about enforcement are subject to legislative 
oversight . . . .”); see also Katherine Pratt, Lessons from the Demise of the Sugary Drink 
Portion Cap Rule, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39, 87 (2015) (“Permitting administrative 
agencies to make difficult policy judgments is permissible because the executive branch is 
politically accountable.”); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer 
the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 264 (2006) (“[P]residents are held politically accountable 
for how the federal government as a whole functions, and in particular for how administrative 
agencies exercise their vast delegated powers.”). 
52 Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy 
for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 360 (2009). 
53 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies 
Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 170-71 (2014). 
54 Id. at 158-59 (“The number of potential rulemakings is extraordinarily high—as is the 
number of adjudications—and agencies must necessarily defer numerous decisions until a 
later time.”). 
55 See Stephenson, supra note 40, at 107 (“The budget and manpower of federal regulatory 
agencies are generally quite limited, and many agencies simply lack the capacity to enforce 
the law adequately.”). 
56 Id. at 110; Waterstone, supra note 43, at 451. 
57 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (describing the theory that “agencies serve not to 
correct but to exacerbate market failures by delivering illicit regulatory favors to those who 
already enjoy excessive market power”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, 
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agencies favor the interests of regulated groups at the expense of the public at 
large.58 Agencies are considered vulnerable to capture when certain interest 
groups have a disproportionate stake in the work of the agency.59 So, for 
instance, “Corporate America” might have captured the SEC,60 or perhaps media 
media firms have captured the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”).61 
Even if not captured, regulators may be concerned with self-promotion rather 
than the public interest—another example of agency slack. Agencies, after all, 
are made up of people with personal interests, objectives, and motivations.62 
Individual government actors may have career aspirations that influence 
enforcement decisions. For example, public employees who aspire to land a job 
within the regulated industry may take deregulatory positions to curry favor with 
prospective employers.63 Alternatively, those who are looking to move up the 
bureaucratic ladder may succumb to political pressure. Others might pursue 
easier cases to ensure a higher win rate, or be overzealous in high-profile cases 
to garner attention.64 
 
Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1341 (2013) 
(explaining “the role of capture in providing a normative foundation for regulatory review” 
and advocating “a reform agenda to help bring the practice of review in line with its 
anticapture justification”); David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
329, 331-32 (2014) (discussing “the possibility of engaging private expertise through certain 
forms of regulatory capture to increase the legitimacy and efficacy of the regulatory process”). 
58 See Croley, supra note 57, at 5; Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and 
Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 630 
(2012) (referring to capture as “the misalignment of incentives of government actors who 
pursue narrow private interests that may conflict with the public interest they purport to 
serve”). 
59 See Croley, supra note 57, at 4. 
60 See, e.g., ARTHUR LEVITT & PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET 106-15 (2002) (citing 
the former SEC chairwoman on how “the business lobby” and “CEOs” successfully used 
Congress and the SEC to thwart reform efforts); Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms: Big Biz Says 
Enough Already, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 2, 2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate 
managers to stifle proxy reform). 
61 See, e.g., Peter DiCola, Note, Choosing Between the Necessity and Public Interest 
Standards in FCC Review of Media Ownership Rules, 106 MICH. L. REV. 101, 129 (2007) 
(“The FCC has been particularly vulnerable to capture . . . .”). 
62 See Bruce L. Benson, Understanding Bureaucratic Behavior: Implications from the 
Public Choice Literature, 2-3 ECONOMIA DELLE SCELTE PUBLICHE [J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. 
CHOICE] 89, 89 (1995) (It.) (“[G]overnment programs are . . . implemented by people who 
have their own concerns, their own interests, and their own views of what is right and 
wrong.”). 
63 Lemos & Minzner, supra note 40, at 859 (“Individual government attorneys may pull 
their punches in enforcement because they hope to secure a job in the regulated 
industry . . . .”). 
64 Id. 
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Other bureaucrats may be less self-absorbed and focused instead on bringing 
prestige to their agency, office, or division. Some enforcement agencies, for 
example, are allowed to keep a portion of any monetary damages they recover.65 
This could very well incentivize regulators to pursue certain enforcement actions 
at the expense of more-deserving cases that lack the same potential for profit.66 
And even if not receiving direct financial benefits, “agencies may have 
reputational interests in [pursuing suits that reap substantial] financial awards.”67 
It is difficult to measure the extent to which each of these various causes 
contributes to regulatory enforcement failure. Solving the problem is therefore 
problematic, and so alternatives to public enforcement—namely, private 
enforcement through litigation—have emerged. 
B. Private Enforcement 
The United States has a long history of enforcing public rights through private 
actors. Guided by the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium—for every right there is a 
remedy—common law courts recognized what we now call “implied right[s] of 
action.”68 The Supreme Court embraced the practice during the Warren era, 
permitting individuals to sue for violations of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 193469 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,70 even though Congress was silent 
as to private entities’ rights under these statutes.71 Moreover, Congress has 
explicitly created private rights of action in certain legislation, the Endangered 
Species Act72 and the Clean Water Act being prime examples.73 These different 
 
65 Id. at 856 (noting that arrangements “allow[ing] enforcement agencies to retain a portion 
of any financial awards they win . . . are common at the state level and beginning to crop up 
in federal law as well” (footnote omitted)). 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 856-57. 
68 See Stephen E. Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action for Minorities and the Poor Through 
Presumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 973-74 (1983). 
69 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012). 
71 See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-55, 557 (1969) (“T]he 
Voting Rights Act does not explicitly grant or deny private parties authorization to seek a 
declaratory judgment . . . . [However,] [t]he guarantee of § 5 [of the Act] that no person shall 
be denied the right to vote . . . might well prove an empty promise unless the private citizen 
were allowed to seek judicial enforcement of the prohibition.”); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (stating that “[i]t appears clear that private parties have a right under 
§ 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14 (a) of the [Securities Exchange] Act” even though 
“petitioners . . . emphasiz[e] that Congress made no specific reference to a private right of 
action in § 14 (a)”). 
72 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11(g), 62 Stat. 1155 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012)). 
73 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-500, § 505, 
86 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012)). 
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types of private actions brought to vindicate public harms are generically 
referred to as “citizen” or “private attorney general” suits. 
Procedural innovations have played an important role in facilitating this 
private enforcement scheme in the United States. The class action,74 a uniquely 
American procedural device until recently,75 allows plaintiffs to sue on behalf 
of a large group of similarly situated individuals to provide redress for 
widespread wrongs. As the Supreme Court once put it, “[t]he aggregation of 
individual claims in the context of a class-wide suit is an evolutionary response 
to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of 
government.”76 
Private attorney general suits may have emerged out of necessity, but they 
have flourished at least in part because of certain advantages they enjoy over 
government action. Most importantly, private parties often have greater 
resources and better access to information than public law enforcers.77 They also 
tend to be less risk averse and nimbler than regulators, so they can advance novel 
legal theories and make quicker decisions.78 Private litigation also provides 
injured parties with direct compensation in a way that public enforcement 
cannot.79 Finally, private litigants are insulated from political pressure and 
bureaucratic pathologies, thus granting them latitude to sue powerful players that 
agencies are simply unwilling to confront. In short, private enforcement serves 
as an important “check” on regulatory capture.80 
 
74 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (listing the prerequisites of a class action, types of class actions, and 
other formalities associated with class actions). 
75 Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American 
Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (explaining that most foreign legal systems have 
resisted class action lawsuits). 
76 Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); see also J. Maria Glover, 
The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1137, 1163 (2012) (“Modern class action practice emerged . . . and the practice 
accordingly developed in response to the inability of centralized government institutions to 
comprehensively address a number of widespread wrongs.”). 
77 See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (contending that 
public regulatory systems will always lack a private party’s access to inside information in 
economic wrongdoings); Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
25 n.120 (2014) (“Injured parties will often have better information than public regulators 
about the source and scope of legal violations.”). 
78 See Davis, supra note 77, at 84. Importantly, the lawyers representing plaintiffs in 
citizen suits, who work on a contingency fee basis, may very well be more risk averse than 
their clients. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why The Model 
of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 230-31 (1983). 
79 See Davis, supra note 77, at 84. 
80 See Engstrom, supra note 40, at 619 (“[P]rivate enforcement leverages private 
information, expertise, and resources while serving to check ‘capture’ of public enforcement 
agencies by regulated parties.”); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 702-03 (2011) (drawing comparisons between state enforcement and 
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Naturally, there are downsides to private litigation as well. A common 
criticism regards private enforcement’s duplicative and overzealous nature, due 
to private parties simply “piggybacking” on regulatory enforcement efforts.81 In 
this way, private enforcement can waste social resources, stymie governmental 
efforts to establish coherent enforcement policy, and lead to overdeterrence.82 
Another critique is that private enforcers are purely profit driven with little 
regard for the public good.83 Unlike the ideal regulator who weighs the social 
costs and benefits of enforcement and exercises prosecutorial discretion, private 
litigants sue as long as they will make money.84 Taking this to the extreme, 
private enforcers will use the threat of litigation, and more specifically discovery 
costs, to extort settlements from defendants for non-meritorious claims.85 Private 
Private litigants can afford to pursue non-meritorious claims because they are 
not accountable for their enforcement decisions in the way that regulators, at 
least theoretically, must answer to the public.86 To be sure, some critics have 
questioned the constitutionality of such private suits to the extent that they 
interfere with the executive branch’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”87 
Regulatory litigation, whether initiated by public or private parties, is 
imperfect. There are costs and benefits to both systems, which perhaps explains 
why a mixed model has emerged and persisted in most areas of the law. As 
David Freeman Engstrom has said: “The institutional design challenge in this 
new regulatory landscape is not choosing between public and private 
enforcement. Rather, it is how to coordinate multiple, overlapping, and 
 
private enforcement with regard to offering a hedge against the possibility of agency capture). 
81 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 40, at 634; Charles W. Sherrer, Joint Ventures on 
Government Contracts: A Walk Through a Rose Garden Planted over Land Mines, 19 PUB. 
CONT. L.J. 331, 342 (1990). 
82 See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1301, 1301 (2008). 
83 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 40, at 634; Stephenson, supra note 40, at 114 (“[P]rivate 
rights of action can lead to inefficiently high levels of enforcement, causing waste of judicial 
resources and leading to excessive deterrence of socially beneficial activity.”). 
84 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 40, at 634 (discussing common critiques of private 
enforcement as opposed to public enforcement efforts); Stephenson, supra note 40, at 128-29 
(explaining different ways in which public enforcement is superior to private enforcement, 
including in identifying important statutory violations). 
85 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 40, at 634 (discussing various “litigation reforms” 
designed to counteract the common issues with private enforcement, including limits on 
discovery and heightened pleading standards). 
86 See id. at 619 (noting that private enforcers are “democratically unaccountable”). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Stephenson, supra note 40, at 120 (“Though private 
enforcement suits have been upheld as constitutional . . . many proponents of a unitary 
executive nonetheless perceive a constitutional problem with allowing private citizens to 
determine the stringency with which the law will be enforced . . . .”). 
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interdependent enforcement mechanisms.”88 For patent law, however, the 
institutional design challenge is different because patent validity is enforced 
almost exclusively through private litigation. 
II. POLICING PATENT VALIDITY 
The constitutionally mandated goal of our patent system is to promote 
innovation to benefit the public.89 Inventors who introduce new technologies 
into the public domain are rewarded with patents: time-limited exclusive rights 
to their inventions.90 Although patents come at a price, the hope is that their 
innovation incentives will outweigh any anticompetitive effect. To this end, 
Congress has established conditions of patentability in an attempt to “draw[] a 
line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an 
exclusive patent, and those which are not.”91 Specifically, a patent is valid if the 
invention is of proper subject matter and is useful, novel, nonobvious, and 
adequately described.92 Poor quality patents, meaning patents that fail to satisfy 
these requirements, impose significant societal costs, including discouraging 
competition, driving up the cost of innovation, and eroding confidence in the 
patent system.93 
Of course, laws and regulations are meaningless if unenforced, so designing 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms is crucial.94 Policymakers must decide 
 
88 Engstrom, supra note 40, at 623. 
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
90 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (describing when patent infringement occurs). 
91 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903). 
92 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (describing the subject matter for which patents may 
be obtained and other conditions for patentability). 
93 Scholars have discussed the effect of bad patents at length. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & 
Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 
40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1228-29 (2004) (documenting the well-known negative consequences 
of granting substandard patents and the difficulties of quantifying the true cost to society); 
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 101, 113-39 (2006) (detailing the numerous negative effects of invalid patents, 
including the exclusionary effect it has on other players entering the market); Robert P. 
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 580-81 (1999) (discussing 
the “negative effects [of] business method patents”); Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent 
Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 83 (2014) (“Invalid claims limit 
commercial freedom, deter potential innovators, and lead to wasteful legal and technical 
undertakings.”). 
94 See, e.g., Clopton, supra note 40, at 306 (“[T]he benefits of redundant enforcement will 
not spring up without careful husbandry in the form of institutional design.”); Glover, supra 
note 76, at 1142 (“[O]ur system of regulation is only as good as the enforcement mechanisms 
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whether to regulate conduct through ex ante regulation, ex post policing, or a 
combination of the two.95 Moreover, if the institutional design calls for ex post 
policing, then the question becomes who should enforce the laws—the 
government, private parties, or both? Throughout history, lawmakers have 
searched for the most effective means of enforcing patent validity requirements 
to ensure that only deserving inventions are protected. 
A. Ex Ante Patent Examination 
After the original Patent Act was passed in 1790, the First Congress 
immediately had to determine how to enforce the new law. The United States 
initially adopted an ex ante examination system, modeled after the French 
system, with the exception that the United States elected to use high-level 
government officials, rather than private individuals, to conduct the 
examination.96 The examination system was soon abandoned, however, because 
the government officials involved found the system to be too time consuming.97 
The United States then moved in 1793 to an English-style registration system, 
where the technical merits of inventions were only reviewed ex post during an 
infringement suit.98 
The country ultimately returned to an examination system with the Patent Act 
of 1836, which marks the beginning of the modern patent system.99 The 1836 
Act established a specialized office, or administrative agency, devoted to 
examining and issuing patents.100 This office—which evolved over time into the 
PTO—was staffed with highly talented scientists who rigorously examined, and 
 
underlying it.”); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking 
the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 76 (noting 
the “great social and political significance” of “the legislative choice of how to implement 
and enforce” laws). 
95 Glover, supra note 76, at 1140 (“Whereas European nations regulate the conduct of their 
citizens largely using ex ante regulations promulgated by a centralized bureaucracy, we 
frequently rely on ex post law enforcement, much of which results from private suits rather 
than from governmental actions.” (footnote omitted)). 
96 John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
685, 714 (2002). 
97 Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. Patent Office, 1790-1836, 5 
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 331, 332 (1995) (“More important duties, however, kept the [patent] board 
from devoting sufficient time to patent matters . . . .”). The government officials included the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General. Id. 
98 Duffy, supra note 96, at 714-15. 
99 Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 
1697-98 (2013) (“[T]he 1836 Act established what we know today as the Patent and 
Trademark Office, an administrative agency devoted to examining and issuing patents.”). 
100 Id.; Duffy, supra note 96, at 714-15 (“When the U.S. returned to an examination system 
in 1836, the development drew upon earlier experiences but also created a specialized 
bureaucracy to perform the task.”). 
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frequently rejected, patent applications.101 By the 1850s, however, the office 
succumbed to pressure from the patent bar and liberalized the examination 
process, resulting in higher grant rates.102 
The PTO’s approach to patent examination has continued to ebb and flow 
over the years. There have been periods when the examination process was 
generally more rigorous or more lax. There have also been times when the PTO 
has subjected certain types of patent applications to varying levels of review. In 
2000, for instance, the PTO established a “second pair of eyes” program to 
enhance the quality of business method patents.103 The agency also developed a 
program called the Sensitive Application Warning System (“SAWS”), which 
allowed examiners to alert PTO leadership when a “sensitive” patent might 
issue.104 Although SAWS dates back to 1994,105 it garnered significant negative 
attention recently,106 causing the PTO to terminate the program last year.107 
Whatever the value of these special procedures, the fact remains that ex ante 
review alone is insufficient to police patent validity. 
 
101 Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in the 
Development of American Patent Law: 1790-1865, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 143, 179-80, 244 
n.145 (2011) (“The thrust of the 1836 Patent Act was to erect a rigorous examination process, 
and the Patent Office during the 1840s staffed its examining corps with some of the best 
scientific talent in the country.”). 
102 Id. (stating that inventors and patent solicitors “repeatedly sought ‘to induce key 
politicians and administrators to seek out those examiners who’ took too strict a view of the 
patentability requirements” (quoting Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” Versus “Scientific Men” 
in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 TECH. & CULTURE 24, 26 (1976))). 
103 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL 
OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) 2 (2000), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S892-DDLC] (requiring a new second-level review of all business method 
patents to ensure compliance with the mandatory search requirements and reasons for 
allowance). 




106 See, e.g., Alyssa Bereznak, The U.S. Government Has a Secret System for Stalling 
Patents, YAHOO! TECH (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/the-u-s-government-has-
a-secret-system-for-104249688314.html [https://perma.cc/5VYL-6AJ4] (“Newly released 
documents reveal that the [Patent] [O]ffice, tasked with evaluating and protecting the rights 
to intellectual property, has a covert system for delaying controversial or inconvenient 
patents.”); Devon Rolf, Secret Examination Procedures at the USPTO: My Experience with 
SAWS, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/12/14/secret-
examination-procedures-at-the-uspto-my-experience-with-saws/id=52638/ (explaining the 
author’s experience with SAWS including the secretive nature of the program). 
107 See Sensitive Application Warning System, supra note 104 (“As the USPTO notified 
the public in January, the Agency has conducted a review of the SAWS program. After 
completing that review, the USPTO has decided to retire this program.”). 
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B. Judicial Review of Patent Validity 
Since the 1836 Act, applications have been examined by an expert agency 
before patents are granted. But the ability to police patents post-issuance remains 
important for a number of reasons. For one, the PTO sometimes makes mistakes 
and grants bad patents.108 Moreover, as the legal standards for patentability 
change—as many have in recent years—inventions that were once subject to a 
valid patent are no longer worthy of protection.109 Finally, although hundreds of 
thousands of patent applications are filed each year, only a very small percentage 
of those applications evolve into “valuable” patents, meaning patents that are 
practiced, licensed, or enforced.110 Thus, lenient ex ante examination arguably 
makes sense, as long as those patents that prove valuable in the long term are 
subject to some sort of ex post review.111 
One option is for courts to review the validity of issued patents. This idea of 
judicial review of agency decision-making, though routine in today’s 
administrative state, was unmapped territory in the early 1800s when 
administrative agencies were just emerging.112 Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise that the opportunities for ex post judicial review under the 1836 Act 
were fairly limited. 
 
108 See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad 
Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005-2006, at 10, 10-13 (“Bad patents are everywhere: 
covering obvious inventions like the crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich, ridiculous 
ideas like a method of exercising a cat with a laser pointer, and impossible concepts like 
traveling faster than the speed of light.”). 
109 See David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1548 
(2014) (stating that the Federal Circuit “has frequently startled the patent law community with 
apparently run-of-the-mill rulings that substantially alter the value of previously issued 
patents”). 
110 See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (“The essential insight of this Essay stems from the little-
acknowledged fact that the overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or even 
licensed.”). 
111 Id. at 1531 (“For the PTO to gather all the information it needs to make real validity 
decisions would take an enormous investment of time and resources. Those decisions can be 
made much more efficiently in litigation . . . .”); Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent 
Law, 39 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 745 (2012) (“Whenever the costs of avoiding the mistake are 
greater than the costs of making it, we will be better off making the mistake.”). 
112 Lemley, supra note 99, at 1697-98, 1707; see also WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 202 (1996) (explaining 
that the earliest administrative agencies in the United States were state and local boards of 
health founded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); Ann Woolhandler, 
Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 608 (1993) (referring to the early nineteenth 
century as the “prebureaucratic era”). 
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1. 1836 Act and “Defensive” Patent Validity Challenges 
The 1836 Act provided for what I refer to as “defensive” validity challenges. 
Because only a valid patent can be infringed, the Act permitted accused 
infringers to raise invalidity of the patent-in-suit as a defense to an infringement 
claim.113 More specifically, defendants might argue that the patent owner was 
not the “original and first inventor.”114 Or perhaps defendants could defeat the 
patent by proving that the invention was “described in some public work” or “in 
public use, or on sale . . . before . . . [the] application for a patent.”115 
Consequently, in most patent cases, the court (or jury) must adjudicate both 
infringement and validity.116 
That Congress had the foresight in 1836 to provide for any sort of judicial 
review of patent validity is remarkable given how rare administrative agencies—
like the PTO—were at the time.117 Indeed, for a long time, already-issued patents 
patents could only be reviewed through defensive validity challenges, and to this 
day, defensive challenges remain the primary way patent validity is tested ex 
post. The problem with defensive validity challenges is that potential infringers 
must wait to be sued for infringement in order to prove a patent invalid. 
Eventually, almost a century after the 1836 Act passed, Congress recognized this 
limitation and began expanding the means for challenging patents in federal 
court. 
2. Declaratory Judgment Act 
In the early twentieth century, Congress considered legislation that would 
allow for anticipatory, or preventive, adjudication for potential patent infringers 
and other would-be defendants.118 After years of debate, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act was finally passed in 1934.119 The Declaratory Judgment Act 
provides that, “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any 
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
 
113 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (describing the pleadings a defendant 
may make in the face of a patent infringement suit). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 See, e.g., Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for Evaluating 
Patent Litigants’ Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 410 
(2007) (“A patent infringement defendant typically asserts one or more declaratory judgment 
counterclaims in response to the patentee’s claim(s) for patent infringement.”); Lemley, supra 
note 99, at 1712 (“Defendants in infringement suits tended to raise validity issues as personal 
defenses to the suit in question.”). 
117 See Lemley, supra note 99, at 1697-98. 
118 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1276 
(2010); La Belle, supra note 22, at 59. 
119 La Belle, supra note 22, at 59 (“Congress actively considered legislation for fifteen 
years before the Declaratory Judgment Act passed . . . .”). 
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declaration.”120 The legislative history makes clear that one reason Congress 
passed the Act was to expand the opportunities for ex post patent challenges: 
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent. You claim that you have 
a patent. What am I going to do about it? There is no way that I can litigate 
my right, which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using 
it, and you [the patent owner] can sit back as long as you please and let me 
run up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and 
then you may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted all 
the time in good faith and on my best judgment, but having no way in the 
world to find out whether I had a right to use that device or not.121 
Thus, the Act intended to improve the plight of accused infringers by allowing 
them to bring “offensive” patent validity challenges. 
While the Declaratory Judgment Act was no doubt a step in the right direction, 
its ability to effectively police patent validity is curbed by various factors. 
Specifically, there are both legal and pragmatic barriers that make it difficult—
if not impossible—for many plaintiffs to pursue patent declaratory judgment 
actions.122 Because I have written about the shortcomings of private validity 
challenges at length in earlier works,123 I will mention them only briefly here. 
Starting with the legal hurdles, the Federal Circuit has interpreted patent 
standing doctrine restrictively, so that only a narrow class of plaintiffs may seek 
declaratory relief in federal court.124 Standing doctrine, consequently, has 
thwarted operating companies and public interest organizations alike from 
 
120 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
121 Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 70th Cong. 35 (1928). 
122 See La Belle, supra note 22, at 68-69 (“In patent declaratory judgment actions, the 
defendant patent owner often responds to the complaint with two concurrent motions. . . . If 
the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate either of these threshold requirements, the court will 
grant the motion(s) to dismiss . . . .”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal 
Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 46 (2010) (“With respect to 
alleged patent infringers, however, there are also certain jurisdictional hurdles that must be 
overcome before declaratory relief may be sought.”). 
123 See La Belle, supra note 22, at 64-67 (documenting a number of “pragmatic 
disincentives facing plaintiffs considering a patent declaratory judgment,” including the 
remedy, the opportunity for the defendant to countersue, and the plaintiff’s concerns about 
putting their own intellectual property at risk); Megan M. La Belle, Standing to Sue in the 
Myriad Genetics Case, 2 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 68, 85-86 (2011) (“[I]n the context of patent 
declaratory judgment actions, the Federal Circuit consistently seems more concerned with the 
plight of patent owners than with the threat that potentially bad patents pose to the public.”). 
124 See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (confining standing to plaintiffs who intend “to actually and 
immediately engage in allegedly infringing BRCA-related activities”), vacated, appeal 
reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013). 
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challenging patents that offer low social value.125 A further hindrance is the 
Federal Circuit’s distorted personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, which often 
precludes plaintiffs from filing patent declaratory judgment actions in 
convenient venues.126 
Yet, even plaintiffs who overcome these legal obstacles face pragmatic 
difficulties when challenging a patent. First, patent litigation is extremely 
expensive and time consuming.127 Second, filing a patent declaratory judgment 
action is almost guaranteed to trigger a counterclaim for infringement, thus 
exposing the patent challenger to an injunction, treble damages, or possibly 
attorney’s fees.128 Third, challenging patents is particularly risky for competitors 
because it may put their own patents in jeopardy (e.g., when a patent is 
scrutinized under § 101).129 Fourth, there is no direct monetary reward for 
winning a patent challenge, unlike in securities and antitrust cases.130 Finally, 
the benefit the challenger reaps—the free use of the patented invention—is 
shared by everyone, including competitors, even though the challenger alone 
bore the cost of invalidating the patent.131 
Recognizing that patent validity is underenforced, scholars have proposed 
various ways to encourage patent challenges in federal court, such as fee 
 
125 See, e.g., Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Alberta Telecomm. Research Ctr., 538 F. App’x 894, 898 
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“In the circumstances presented here, that interest is simply insufficient to 
give rise to a current, justiciable case or controversy upon which federal declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction may be predicated.”); Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 
718 F.3d 1350, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The appellants have alleged no concrete plans or 
activities to use or sell greater than trace amounts of modified seed, and accordingly fail to 
show any risk of suit on that basis.”). 
126 See La Belle, supra note 122, at 77-81. 
127 See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence 
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2009) (“Patent litigation 
has alternatively been called the sport of kings and the business of sharks.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
128 See, e.g., Ewing & Feldman, supra note 30, at 10 (providing an example of a 
counterclaim from a patent infringement suit when TiVo sued Verizon). 
129 See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 623-24 (2005) 
(“If core patents are distributed roughly evenly among firms participating in a market . . . , 
those firms will have a strong incentive to enter into cross-licenses, since their interests are 
symmetrical: they need their competitors’ patents just as much as the competitors need their 
patents.”). 
130 See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 704-05 (2004). 
131 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
569, 618 n.361 (2002) (discussing the “free rider” problem). 
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shifting,132 bounties,133 and joint defense agreements.134 Others have urged a 
more fundamental shift for validity challenges away from federal court towards 
administrative adjudication at the PTO.135 This suggestion to dejudicialize 
patent validity challenges gained some traction in the 1980s, but did not take 
hold and begin to revolutionize the patent litigation landscape until the passage 
of the AIA in 2011. 
C. Administrative Review of Patent Validity 
For the first 150 years in its history, the PTO’s role in policing patent validity 
was limited. The agency reviewed patents ex ante and decided whether or not a 
patent should issue. If the patent was rejected, the applicant could appeal to a 
board of examiners.136 But once a patent was granted, it was the courts—not the 
PTO—that evaluated a patent’s validity. That began to change in the early 1980s 
as Congress incrementally expanded the PTO’s jurisdiction over various 
proceedings for challenging already-issued patents. 
1. Early Post-Grant Proceedings 
Congress introduced the first post-grant administrative proceedings, ex parte 
reexamination (or “reexam”), in 1980.137 Ex parte reexam allows either the 
patent owner or a third party to ask the PTO to take a second look at “doubtful 
patents.”138 This procedure was intended “to strengthen investor confidence in 
 
132 See, e.g., Gaia Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1449 (“[F]ee shifting is applicable to the 
diverse array of end user cases and can contribute toward leveling the footing of end users in 
all type of end user-patentee disputes.”). 
133 See Miller, supra note 27, at 704-05 (proposing a bounty system in patent litigation that 
would reward a patent challenger with cash after a successful suit). 
134 Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the 
Patent-Challenge-Bloc’s Antitrust Status, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (discussing how 
joint-venture agreements would address market failures under the current patent regime). 
135 See Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the 
America Invents Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 122-24 (2011); Farrell & Merges, supra 
note 27, at 960-64 (postulating numerous ways to improve PTO examination in lieu of 
litigation). 
136 See Burstein, supra note 9, at 1762-63 (explaining the establishment of the modern 
system of patent examination and the processes by which a defendant could appeal). Three 
years after passing the 1836 Act, Congress passed the Act to Promote the Progress of the 
Useful Arts, which allowed applicants who were dissatisfied with the board’s decision to 
appeal to federal court. Id. at 1763 n.69. 
137 See 126 CONG. REC. 34,412-13 (1980) (reporting passage of reexamination provisions 
in December 1980); Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Time 
for Corrective Surgery, Or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 217, 223 (2003) (explaining that Congress passed a bill in December 1980 
incorporating the American Bar Association’s suggestions for reexamination). 
138 Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting H.R. REP. 
NO. 96-1307, at 3-4 (1980)). 
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the certainty of patent rights . . . without recourse to expensive and lengthy 
infringement litigation.”139 To ensure that ex parte reexam remained affordable 
and efficient, certain provisions restricted its scope.140 For instance, a third party 
requesting reexam was not permitted to participate in the proceeding, and the 
substantive grounds for reexam were limited to a few validity defenses based on 
certain types of prior art.141 The impact of reexam was further dampened by the 
fact that the PTO’s decisions were not binding on courts.142 Even if the PTO 
upheld a patent during reexam, in other words, validity could be relitigated in 
federal court.143 Due to these limitations, third parties rarely availed themselves 
of ex parte reexam.144 
Over the next two decades, the federal judiciary’s patent docket steadily grew 
and the costs of litigation continued to rise. Congress again attempted to alleviate 
these problems by creating administrative avenues for patent validity challenges. 
In 1999, Congress enacted the American Inventors Protection Act (“AIPA”),145 
which created a new post-grant review proceeding called inter partes reexam 
that allowed for greater participation by third-party patent challengers.146 For 
example, third-party challengers could comment on the patent owner’s 
 
139 Id. 
140 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter INTER PARTES REPORT] 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9NMF-4M9S] (finding that ex parte reexam procedure was established “to 
serve as an expedited, low-cost alternative to patent litigation for reviewing only certain 
aspects of patent validity”). 
141 Id. at 2 (“Congressional review indicated infrequent use of ex parte reexamination, 
primarily because a third party who requested reexamination was unable to participate in the 
examination stage of the reexamination after initiating the reexamination proceeding.”); Mark 
D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for 
U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 53 (1997) (“During reexamination, the PTO 
examines the patent claims on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications only.”). 
142 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.3.4.5 (2013) (“An ex parte reexamination 
carries no threat of an estoppel against an unsuccessful third-party requester. The requester 
can continue to contest validity in a judicial action although a PTO confirmation will tend to 
make that contest more difficult.”). 
143 Id. 
144 Between 2000 and 2004, over 835,000 patents issued, but only 1719 ex parte reexams 
were filed. Eric Williams, Remembering the Public’s Interest in the Patent System - A Post-
Grant Opposition Designed to Benefit the Public, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 
110702, at 3. 
145 See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-
552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
146 Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501A-567 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318). 
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responses to PTO actions and could appeal the PTO’s ultimate validity decision 
to the Federal Circuit.147 
Notwithstanding these additional safeguards, third parties’ reliance on ex 
parte reexam remained sporadic. This initial hesitancy may have been due to 
various shortcomings in the proceedings, including: the lack of discovery and 
cross-examination; the inability to challenge patents issued before 1999; the 
narrow scope of validity defenses available; and the preclusive effect of the 
reexam determination in subsequent patent litigation.148 With time, however, the 
use of inter partes reexam began to pick up, at least in part because the costs 
were much lower than federal court litigation. Between 2009 and 2011, for 
instance, more than 900 inter partes reexams were initiated.149 But as these 
proceedings grew in popularity, the longer it took the PTO to issue decisions. 
By 2011, the average pendency for inter partes reexam was over three years.150 
Thus, Congress was called upon once again to reform the system. 
2. AIA and Post-Grant Proceedings 
Many factors contributed to the call for patent reform that culminated in the 
AIA’s passage in 2011, including the growing concern over patent quality and 
the need for international harmonization. The AIA—the most comprehensive 
patent reform legislation in over fifty years—revamped the patent system by 
switching to first-to-file priority,151 redefining novelty and prior art,152 and 
expanding prior user rights.153 Perhaps even more fundamentally, however, the 
AIA includes numerous provisions that have reshaped the PTO’s institutional 
identity. For one, the AIA delegates fee-setting authority to the PTO,154 which 
allows the agency to adjust fees based on its costs. The AIA also empowers the 
agency to decide matters of patent validity through various post-grant 
 
147 Congress did not provide the right to appeal to the Federal Circuit in the initial 
legislation, but amended the AIPA in 2002 to provide for this and other rights to try to promote 
the use of inter partes reexam. See INTER PARTES REPORT, supra note 140, at 2-3. 
148 Id. at 4, 6-7. 
149 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 
(2013), https://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Y64D-J4TV] (indicating that 258 reexams were filed in 2009, 281 in 
2010, and 374 in 2011 for a total of 913 reexams filed during the years 2009-2011). 
150 See Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America Invents, More 
or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 249 (2012) (explaining that inter partes 
reexam currently takes more than thirty-six months). 
151 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (providing that inventions cannot be patented if “patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention”). 
152 Id. (eliminating the geographic restrictions on prior art). 
153 Id. § 273. 
154 Id. § 41. 
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adjudicatory proceedings.155 Much like reexam, these proceedings—which 
include post-grant review (“PGR”), inter partes review (“IPR”), and review for 
covered business method patents (“CBM”)—are intended to provide a more 
efficient and less expensive alternative for challenging already-issued patents.156 
A comprehensive discussion of the nature of these new AIA proceedings and 
how they differ from their predecessors (e.g., reexam) is beyond the scope of 
this Article.157 There are a few highlights worth mentioning, though. One is that 
the PTAB—a panel of PTO judges—rather than the examining corps conducts 
the review.158 Another major change is that PGR, IPR, and CBM proceedings 
must be completed within a limited amount of time. The PTO will generally 
issue a written decision within eighteen months of the initial petition, although 
it could take as long as twenty-four months in rare circumstances.159 Either way, 
the review process under the AIA is substantially faster than inter partes reexam. 
Parties involved in IPR, PGR, and CBM proceedings are also afforded 
additional procedural protections, including the right to conduct discovery and 
to have an oral hearing.160 These safeguards were supposed to help make 
administrative review a realistic alternative to federal court litigation. In a 
similar vein, Congress made the preclusive effects of the new AIA proceedings 
more robust than reexam. Specifically, estoppel attaches as soon at the PTAB 
issues a written decision, and parties are precluded from relitigating issues that 
were or could have been raised before the PTO.161 Moreover, at least with 
respect to PGR, a broader range of defenses is available to patent challengers 
than in the past. The challenger, for instance, may contest the patent for lack of 
adequate written description or improper subject matter, and may raise prior art 
other than patents and printed publications in challenging the patent on 
 
155 Id. §§ 311-319 (codifying the procedure for inter partes review); id. §§ 321-329 
(codifying the procedure for PGR, including the transitional program for covered business-
method patents). 
156 See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of 
II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 653 (2012). 
157 For a detailed discussion see, for example, Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 881, 909-23 (2015) (arguing that the new AIA proceedings are “not a 
replacement, but rather an addition to” the earlier version of ex parte reexam); Wasserman, 
supra note 6, at 1993 (comparing PGR to reexam). 
158 35 U.S.C. § 6 (establishing the PTAB, which is composed of judges who review 
rejected patent applications and reexam appeals, and conduct derivation proceedings, IPR, 
and PGR). 
159 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(c), 42.200(c), 42.300(c) (2016) (requiring that IPR, PGR, and 
CBM proceedings be administered such that pendency before the PTAB is no more than one 
year with an extension lasting no more than six months with good cause or in case of joinder). 
160 35 U.S.C. § 326(a). 
161 Id. § 315(e) (prohibiting petitioners from raising a claim before the PTO, district court, 
or ITC if they raised or reasonably could have raised the claim in IPR); id. § 325(e) (same 
with respect to PGR). 
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anticipation or obviousness grounds.162 Finally, parties dissatisfied with the 
PTO’s decision in IPR, PGR, or CBM may appeal directly to the Federal 
Circuit.163 
The goal for these changes was to encourage patent challenges by making it 
quicker and cheaper to invalidate bad patents.164 As Judge Newman recently 
explained, “[t]he premise [was] that an adversarial evidentiary proceeding in the 
PTO [would] reliably resolve most issues of patent validity, without the expense 
and delay of district court litigation, and sometimes even before infringement 
has occurred.”165 While the full impact of these new laws remains to be seen, 
what’s already clear is that these PTAB proceedings are further reaching than 
anticipated. 
3. Impact of PTAB Proceedings 
Between September 16, 2012 (when the AIA became effective) and 
September 30, 2016, a total of 5656 IPR, PGR, and CBM petitions were filed.166 
The vast majority of these petitions are IPRs (5143) with CBMs coming in a 
distant second (476). Only thirty-seven PGRs have been filed because that 
proceeding applies exclusively to recently granted patents, but those numbers 
are sure to increase.167 At this pace, the PTAB will soon be deciding patent 
validity ex post far more often than federal courts.168 
Yet it’s not just the volume of petitions that has caught many off guard, but 
the substance of the PTAB’s decisions as well.169 Early studies indicate that 
patent challengers are enjoying high rates of success with these new 
 
162 Id. § 321(b) (allowing petitioner to “request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims 
of a patent on any ground” that could be raised in federal court litigation). 
163 Id. § 329 (explaining that any party has the right to appeal a decision by the PTAB). 
164 See Matal, supra note 156, at 653 (exploring the legislative history of these provisions, 
including Congress’s intention to provide a cheaper and more efficient alternative to 
litigation); Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498-
99 (2012) (detailing the discretion the AIA affords to the PTO to prioritize and expedite 
patents and “weed out low quality patents”). 
165 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting), aff’d sub nom. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
166 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 2 
(2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_ 
september2016A.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8G8-68GR] (detailing the number of AIA petitions 
filed during this period). 
167 Id. (stating the number of PGR petitions filed since the AIA’s inception). 
168 See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing the downward trend in patent 
litigation). 
169 See Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the 
Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93, 93 (2014) (“As partial data on IPR has trickled 
out via the blogosphere, interest from patent practitioners and judges has grown to a fever 
(and sometimes fevered) pitch.” (footnote omitted)). 
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proceedings.170 In IPRs, petitioners have won complete victories almost two-
thirds of the time when pursuing their petitions to a final decision.171 And even 
when not securing a total win, petitioners have managed to persuade the PTAB 
to institute IPR on at least one challenged claim in eighty-four percent of 
proceedings.172 
Based on these high rates of invalidation, critics have referred to the PTAB 
alternatively as a “death squad”173 and a “killing field.”174 Former Chief Judge 
Rader stated at an intellectual property conference that the PTO “was in tension 
with itself, with thousand[s] of examiners ‘giving birth’ to patents and hundreds 
of judges on the PTAB ‘acting as death squads, kind of killing property 
rights.’”175 A former high-level PTO official similarly criticized the agency for 
“creating” and then “destroying” patents, wondered how long such a “business 
model” can last, and warned that “if the PTAB continues on this path, the raison 
d’etre of the Patent Office and the entire patent system will be called into 
question.”176 
The PTO’s initial reaction to this criticism was somewhat defensive. During 
an AIA roundtable in April 2014, a panel of judges denied that the PTAB is a 
“death squad.”177 Former Chief Judge Smith said the PTAB does not set out to 
 
170 See id. at 101 (finding that the PTAB invalidated all instituted IPR claims almost 78% 
of the time). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 100. A more recent study finds that the rate at which the PTAB is instituting IPRs 
has been slowly and consistently declining since 2012. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. 
Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 78, 107 (2016). 
173 Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially Viable Patents 
Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/03/24/ptab-
death-squads-are-all-commercially-viable-patents-invalid/id=48642/ (quoting former Fed. 
Cir. Chief Judge Randall Rader, Comments at the 2013 American Intellectual Property Law 
Association Annual Meeting (Oct. 25, 2013)). 
174 Erich Spangenberg, Patent Predictions for 2015, IPNAV: BLOG (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www.ipnav.com/blog/erich-spangenbergs-patent-predictions-for-2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/XsN4-XQRG]. 
175 Ryan Davis, PTAB’s “Death Squad” Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360 
(Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-
label-not-totally-off-base-chief-says [https://perma.cc/7FXK-DCJ6]. 
176 Sterne & Quinn, supra note 173. While Rob Sterne and Gene Quinn do not identify the 
“former top USPTO official,” I heard John Whealan (former Deputy General Counsel for 
Intellectual Property Law and Solicitor at the PTO) make these same observations at the 
Center for American and International Law’s 52nd Annual Conference on Intellectual 
Property Law on November 10, 2014 in Plano, Texas. 
177 Erica Teichert, PTAB Says It’s Not a “Death Squad” for Patents, LAW360 (Apr. 15, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/528519/ptab-says-it-s-not-a-death-squad-for-patents 
[https://perma.cc/ZM56-QZ6L] (citing the panel as saying “only a small fraction of patents 
under inter IPR end up being completely invalidated”). 
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invalidate patent claims, but instead “approaches its decisions in a very neutral 
manner.”178 Just a few months later, though, Judge Smith seemed to embrace the 
label explaining that if the PTAB was not “doing some ‘death squadding,’ [it] 
would not be doing what the [AIA] calls on [the PTAB] to do.”179 In other words, 
words, Judge Smith proclaimed, the PTAB is simply doing what Congress 
intended. 
Whether the PTAB is functioning as hoped is hard to say at this point. On the 
one hand, the PTAB is canceling a high percentage of challenged patent 
claims.180 On the other hand, the patents being invalidated may not be those 
targeted by the AIA. At least one study shows, for example, that most challenged 
patents are owned by operating companies, not Patent Assertion Entities 
(“PAEs”) or trolls.181 What is more, anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
PTAB proceedings are initiated purely as a negotiation tactic or, even worse, to 
harass patent owners.182 The open question, then, is not whether enough but 
whether the “right” patent claims are being cancelled as a result of administrative 
review. 
Nor is it clear if these new procedures are providing an efficient and 
inexpensive alternative to litigation as Congress intended. Thus far, the vast 
majority of PTAB proceedings have been initiated after an infringement suit was 
already filed.183 Critics claim, therefore, that PTAB proceedings are 
complicating patent litigation, not streamlining it.184 Although this argument has 
 
178 Id. 
179 Davis, supra note 175. 
180 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 169, at 100-01. 
181 See Gregory J. Gonsalves, T.C. Beckett & Barry Leff, Trends in Inter Partes Review 
and Covered Business Method Review, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 20, 20 
(stating that sixty percent of IPR and CBM proceedings have been filed against patents owned 
by operating companies, while only twenty-five percent have been filed against those owned 
by PAEs). 
182 See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 157, at 931-34 (discussing “rent seeking” abuses of PTAB 
proceedings). The PTO recently released a new set of proposed rules in an attempt to curb 
these abuses of the PGR system. See Jason N. Mock, Will New PTAB Rules Impact IPRs Filed 
by Kyle Bass Hedge Fund?, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 21, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/will-new-ptab-rules-impact-iprs-filed-kyle-bass-
hedge-fund [https://perma.cc/2GC9-PRJS]. 
183 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 169, at 103 (finding that in eighty percent of IPRs 
the challenged patent was also asserted in litigation between petitioner and respondent); 
Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 172, at 69 (“[A]bout 86.8% of IPR- or CBM-
challenged patents are also being litigated in federal courts.”). Notably, current data focuses 
on IPRs and CBMs because only patents issued under the first-to-file system are subject to 
PGR. To date, only thirty-seven PGRs have been initiated. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, supra note 166, 8-9 (citing the PTAB’s trial statistics). With PGRs, however, it is less 
likely that the patent will be the subject of co-pending litigation since a PGR must be initiated 
within nine months of the patent’s issuance. See 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). 
184 See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 157, at 947. 
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initial appeal, it is not that simple. The data indicate that courts usually stay 
litigation pending the outcome of PTAB review.185 If the PTAB cancels one or 
more patent claims, the litigation will be simplified or even mooted. And even 
if the court denies a stay, the PTAB’s decision could still influence co-pending 
litigation by narrowing the issues, encouraging settlement, or ending the 
litigation if the patents-in-suit are invalidated.186 
The bottom line is that it is too early to draw conclusions about either the 
merit or full implications of these new proceedings. While PTAB review may 
complicate patent litigation in the short term, perhaps the long-term effects will 
be different. There is some evidence, albeit speculative, that the mere possibility 
of PTAB review is discouraging patent owners from filing infringement suits in 
the first place.187 Recent studies show that patent infringement suits are on the 
decline; there was a thirteen percent decline in patent litigation in 2014 
compared to the previous year,188 and an additional two percent decline in 
2015.189 Several factors are likely contributing to this trend, but the threat of 
PTAB review may be key to this patent litigation decline. If that proves true, 
 
185 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 169, at 94 (“Litigation proceeding in parallel with 
an instituted IPR is stayed about 82 percent of the time.”). 
186 Meaghan Hemmings Kent et al., United States: 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Patent 
Litigation Should Consider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ (Apr. 26, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+Reasons+Every+Defendant+in+
Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review [https://perma.cc/KLL8-Z9PG] 
(“The longer the patent owner waits to settle, the greater the risk that the PTAB will not 
terminate the proceeding, and may cancel the claims despite a request to terminate. Petitioners 
can use this time crunch to pressure the patent owner into earlier settlement in order to save 
the patent from IPR.”). 
187 See Love & Ambwani, supra note 169, at 105 (“[F]or a substantial number of patents, 
[IPR] appears to act as a complete substitute for litigation.”); Dennis Crouch, A Major Drop 
in Patent Infringement Litigation?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/patent-infringement-litigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4GY-63YR] (analyzing the forty percent drop in new patent litigation 
between October 2013 and October 2014); Richard Lloyd, Alice Decision a Big Reason for 
Sharp Fall in U.S. Patent Litigation, Says Mark Lemley, IAM (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.iam-
magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=dadf4dce-0f75-45dc-9339-dacb0f7bb465. 
188 CHRIS BERRY ET AL., PWC, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2015) [hereinafter PWC 
STUDY 2015] (concluding that patent litigation declined in 2014 for the first time in five 
years). This decline, while significant, is not as steep as studies conducted earlier in the year 
indicated. See Brian Howard, September 2014 New Patent Case Filings Down 40% from 
September 2013, LEXMACHINA (Oct. 8, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/2014/10/september-
2014-new-patent-case-filings-40-september-2013/ [https://perma.cc/76S4-9EJ3] (finding 
that, as of September 2014, there were forty percent fewer new patent suits filed in federal 
court compared to 2013). 
189 CHRIS BERRY ET AL., PWC, 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 1 (2016). 
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then the PTAB proceedings would seem to be fulfilling at least one the AIA’s 
aims: the reduction of patent litigation in federal court.190 
Whatever future data may reveal, the fact is that administrative review—like 
district court litigation—has limited capacity to police patent validity. IPR, 
CBM, and PGR may cost less than traditional litigation, but they are still 
expensive and the “free rider” problem remains.191 A petitioner who offensively 
challenges a patent at the PTO also runs the risk of being sued for infringement 
in federal court.192 And while there are fewer procedural hurdles at the PTAB 
than in federal court, public interest organizations continue to be stymied in their 
efforts to challenge patents. In Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation,193 for example, a public interest organization initiated an 
IPR on patents related to human stem cells.194 After losing at the PTAB, 
Consumer Watchdog appealed to the Federal Circuit, as expressly permitted by 
statute.195 The Federal Circuit then raised the question of Article III standing sua 
sponte,196 and ultimately dismissed Consumer Watchdog’s appeal, allowing the 
patent to survive.197 
Since 1836, Congress has recognized the need to test the validity of already-
issued patents. The means for challenging patents ex post have expanded over 
time, so that patent validity can now be challenged defensively or offensively, 
in federal court or at the PTO. Some critics believe that it’s too easy now to 
challenge patents,198 while others argue an underenforcement problem persists. 
Without wading too deeply into that debate, this Article makes the point that all 
of those validity challenges—all of those enforcement decisions—are being 
made by private parties. Considering the substantial policy implications of 
patent validity challenges, at least some of those enforcement decisions should 
be made by regulators. 
 
190 See David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 702 (2013) 
(identifying the reduction of patent litigation abuse as a goal of the AIA). 
191 See Kent, et al., supra note 186 (estimating that PTAB proceedings cost between 
$200,000 and $750,000). 
192 Indeed, only about thirteen percent of patents challenged at the PTAB are not already 
subject to litigation in federal court. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 172, at 71. 
This suggests that private parties are equally reluctant to launch offensive validity challenges 
at the PTAB as they are through declaratory judgment actions in federal court. See La Belle, 
supra note 122, at 53 n.59 (citing studies finding that only between nine to fourteen percent 
of patent suits are declaratory judgment actions filed by accused infringers). 
193 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
194 Id. at 1260. 
195 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) (stating that parties dissatisfied with PTAB decisions may 
appeal to the Federal Circuit). 
196 Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260. 
197 Id. (“Because Consumer Watchdog has not established an injury in fact sufficient to 
confer Article III standing, however, this court dismisses the appeal.”). 
198 See generally Dolin, supra note 157. 
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III. THE PATENT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY 
A commonly stated goal of private enforcement is to supplement the public 
resources available for discovering, deterring, and vindicating social harms.199 
Whatever its deficiencies, private litigation is merely a gap-filler or a backstop 
in areas such as antitrust, securities, environmental, and civil rights, where 
robust public enforcement regimes exist. Yet private suits are the lone 
mechanism for policing validity of already-issued patents. There is no equivalent 
of the antitrust or civil rights division within the DOJ for patents. Nor does the 
PTO have an enforcement arm like the SEC or the EPA. Though agencies do 
play some role in patent litigation, it is limited and peripheral.200 Thus, this Part 
of the Article sets out to explain the lack of—but need for—agency enforcement 
of patent validity, why the PTO is the right agency for the job, and how it could 
be implemented effectively. 
A. The Current Lack of Public Enforcement of Patent Validity 
There are several potential explanations for why our patent system currently 
lacks a public mechanism for enforcing patent validity ex post. First, the patent 
system and the PTO emerged at a different point in history than most other 
administrative agencies. The SEC, FTC, and many other agencies were created 
in the 1930s during the New Deal Era, and the EPA was established even later 
in the 1970s. The PTO, on the other hand, is a relic of the nineteenth century, a 
period before lawmakers had conceptualized the modern, multifunctional 
agency imbued with rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers.201 
Stated differently, the powers held by these agencies—or the lack thereof—may 
simply be “a product of the time they came into existence.”202 
Another explanation for the lack of public validity enforcement is that courts 
mistakenly believed the government could only challenge patents based on 
fraud. This mistaken belief dates back to two late-nineteenth century decisions 
from the Supreme Court in disputes between the United States and the American 
Bell Telephone Company.203 In the first suit (American Bell I), the United States 
 
199 See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 77, at 12-13 (providing a brief overview of private justice 
in the United States). 
200 See, e.g., Tejas N. Narechania, Patent Conflicts, 103 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1484-85 (2015) 
(discussing the image of the PTO as “removed from the practical uses” of the new inventions 
and discoveries they regulate); Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. 
L. REV. 205, 206-07 (2015) (arguing that the PTO has “largely disclaimed a role in reforming 
patent litigation” and that patent reform efforts have “largely ignored the variety of roles 
administrative agencies—especially agencies other than the PTO—play in patent litigation”). 
201 See Masur, supra note 9, at 302-03 (explaining that the PTO was created during a period 
when the United States was “much smaller and economically less complex” and “regulatory 
agencies (as we understand them today) were essentially unknown”). 
202 Id. at 303. 
203 See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (Am. Bell II), 167 U.S. 224, 261-69 (1897); 
United Sates v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (Am. Bell I), 128 U.S. 315, 370-73 (1888). 
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sought to cancel two of American Bell’s patents on the ground that defendants 
had defrauded the PTO.204 American Bell countered that the U.S. lacked the 
authority to bring such a suit, but the Supreme Court rejected that argument.205 
In so doing, the Court relied on land patent cases holding that the government 
had the power not only to cancel patents based on fraud, but patents issued by 
mistake or error as well.206 The Supreme Court then remanded the case for a 
decision on the merits as to whether the patents-in-suit were in fact obtained 
through fraud.207 
Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court decided another case in which the 
U.S. again sought to cancel one of American Bell’s patents for fraud (American 
Bell II).208 The Court began its opinion by acknowledging that American Bell I 
established the government’s right to maintain such a suit.209 The Court went on 
to explain: 
[Suits] may be maintained by the Government in its own courts to set aside 
one of its patents, not only when it has a proprietary and pecuniary interest 
in the result, but also when it is necessary in order to enable it to discharge 
its obligations to the public . . . .210 
Ultimately, however, the government lost on the merits in American Bell II 
because it adduced insufficient evidence to prove the patent was obtained 
fraudulently.211 
Though both the American Bell I and American Bell II decisions involved 
allegations of fraud, neither decision held that the government could only cancel 
patents when there was fraud. Still, for decades to come, that is how courts and 
commentators interpreted those two cases.212 Seemingly, this confusion should 
 
204 Am. Bell I, 128 U.S. at 353. The patents were issued to Alexander Graham Bell and 
assigned to American Bell Telephone Co. The government sued both Bell and his company. 
Id. at 350. 
205 Id. at 358 (“[Prior precedent] establish[es] the right of the United States to bring suits 
in its own courts to be relieved against fraud committed in cases of that class exactly similar 
to that charged in the present case.”). 
206 Id. at 365-68. 
207 Id. at 373. 
208 Am. Bell II, 167 U.S. at 242. 
209 Id. at 237-38. 
210 Id. at 264. 
211 Id. at 251-52. 
212 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 12-14 (D.D.C. 1969) 
(refusing to recognize a “dormant” power of the government to invalidate a patent on grounds 
other than fraud or deceit when defendant in an antitrust action has not asserted its patent as 
a defense to antitrust claims), rev’d, 410 U.S. 52 (1973); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
53 F. Supp. 889, 895 (D.D.C. 1943), rev’d, 333 U.S. 364 (1948); Improperly Procured 
Patents: FTC Jurisdiction and Remedial Power, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1509 (1964) (“[I]t 
has long been held that the Justice Department has no standing to sue for cancellation of an 
invalid patent. Although it can procure cancellation of a patent fraudulently procured . . . .” 
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have ended in 1948 when the Supreme Court rejected such an interpretation in 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co. and allowed the government to attack a 
patent’s validity.213 In Gypsum, an antitrust suit, the Court reversed the lower 
court’s decision that American Bell I and American Bell II precluded the 
government from attacking patents absent fraud.214 The Court explained that the 
government should be able to challenge patent validity “because of the public 
interest in free competition,” and stated that “it seems inadvisable to leave the 
[American Bell decisions] as a precedent.”215 
Yet, even two decades after Gypsum, courts continued to bar the government 
from suing to cancel invalid patents. In United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., for 
example, the district court narrowly construed Gypsum to hold that the U.S. may 
only attack validity where the patent is raised in defense of an antitrust suit.216 
Thus, the district court reasoned, there are two exceptions to the general rule that 
the government cannot cancel patents: (1) fraud (American Bell I and II) and (2) 
to defend antitrust suits (Gypsum).217 Because neither exception applied in 
Glaxo, the court rejected the government’s attempt to invalidate the patents.218 
Although the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s holding in Glaxo on 
appeal,219 the point remains that public challenges to patent validity were 
prohibited—or confined to a small subset of cases—for the better part of a 
century. Today, our patent system looks dramatically different than it did fifty 
years ago, except that we still lack a robust system for publicly policing already-
issued patents. 
B. The Need for Public Enforcement of Patent Validity 
There was a time in the not-too-distant past when a consensus had been 
reached that patent validity was underenforced. Critics claimed there were too 
many bad patents, yet private parties were generally unwilling to invalidate 
patents.220 With the changes that the AIA wrought and the creation of the PTAB, 
however, some commentators argue that we now have an overenforcement 
 
(footnote omitted)); Wm. Redin Woodward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a 
Problem of Administrative Law, 55 HARV. L. REV. 950, 956 (1942) (“[T]he public 
authority . . . cannot attack a patent on behalf of the public except in cases of fraud.”); Note, 
Vulnerability of Patents to Attack in Anti-Trust Suits, 53 YALE L.J. 579, 579, 581-85 (1944) 
(discussing cases that held the government may not attack patent validity except for fraud). 
213 Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 388. 
214 Id. at 386-87. 
215 Id. at 387. 
216 Glaxo, 302 F. Supp. at 11-12. 
217 Id. at 11-12, 15. 
218 Id. at 15. 
219 United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1973). 
220 See La Belle, supra note 22, at 64-67 (explaining disincentives that face private parties 
seeking to challenge a patent’s validity in federal court). 
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problem.221 Indeed, although the PTAB has been operational for just over four 
years,222 legislation has been introduced to amend the AIA and to make it more 
difficult to challenge already-issued patents at the PTO.223 
When the dust settles and the trends become clear again, I believe we will see 
that very little has actually changed as a result of these administrative 
proceedings. First, whether in federal court or at the PTO, parties are 
disincentivized from challenging patents because there is no monetary recovery 
and because the “free rider” problem remains.224 Patent validity enforcement, 
therefore, is insulated from overdeterrence in a way that securities and antitrust 
enforcement are not.225 Second, although there have been a higher-than-
expected number of petitions for PTAB review, the vast majority of those have 
come in cases with parallel litigation.226 In other words, there are not 
substantially more patents being challenged, they are simply being challenged 
in multiple venues. Finally, despite the high volume of petitions, a substantial 
portion of IPRs will settle or be dismissed without the PTAB making a validity 
determination, allowing those patents to remain intact.227 
But even assuming for argument’s sake that there are too many private 
validity challenges, there remains an acute need for regulatory action in this area. 
Enforcement decisions are an integral part of agency policymaking.228 Agencies 
 
221 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Innovation Act Would Revamp AIA Reviews to Shield Patents, 
LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2015, 8:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/620442/innovation-act-
would-revamp-aia-reviews-to-shield-patents [https://perma.cc/SZ4E-XR4R] (explaining 
legislative reform bill that would restrict PTAB’s use of the broadest-reasonable-
interpretation standard when reviewing patents). 
222 See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 
48,680, 48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012) (noting an effective date of September 16, 2012 for the PTO 
regulations implementing the AIA). 
223 See Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 9 (2015) (changing the claim construction 
standard for IPR and PGR); Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth 
(STRONG) Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. §§ 102-103 (2015) (same). 
224 See supra Part II (discussing how parties are reluctant to launch patent challenges 
because competitors get a “free ride” if the patent is invalidated). 
225 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 40, at 127-43 (discussing the overenforcement 
problem in other private litigation regimes). 
226 Love & Ambwani, supra note 169, at 103-05 (“[I]n 80 percent of IPRs, the challenged 
patent was also asserted in litigation between the petitioner and respondent.”). 
227 See id. at 97 n.19 (“An IPR can terminate in one of four ways: settlement, a decision 
not to institute the petition, a final written decision from the PTAB, or a request for adverse 
judgment from the patentee.”). 
228 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 685 (2014) (“Recent presidential administrations, indeed, have repeatedly relied on 
enforcement discretion as a tool of policymaking.”); Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control 
Across Agency Policymaking Forms, at 20 (U.N.C. Legal Studs. Res. Paper No. 2571068, 
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571068## 
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set policies and then carry them out, at least in part, through enforcement actions. 
By exercising enforcement discretion in some circumstances, but refraining in 
others, agencies can shape the law and move it in a particular direction.229 In the 
patent context, there are agencies tasked with establishing innovation policy—
primarily the PTO—but no agency implements that policy through ex post 
enforcement.230 While the PTO’s ex ante review reflects the agency’s policies 
to some degree,231 given how long patents remain in force, and that validity 
requirements change, the agency’s lack of involvement post-issuance is 
troubling. 
Several recent cases illustrate why public enforcement of patent validity is 
normatively justified. The Supreme Court has been very active in patent law in 
the past decade. As had been its practice historically, the Court reviewed many 
patent cases involving difficult procedural questions, including standing, subject 
matter jurisdiction, and burdens of proof.232 Yet the Court has also weighed in 
on several matters that go to the heart of patent law, including § 101’s standard 
 
[https://perma.cc/3UNT-NC7C] (“Agencies . . . possess a range of policymaking tools at their 
disposal—including rulemaking, the issuance of guidance documents, and the strategic 
exercise of enforcement discretion . . . .”). 
229 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law 
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 126 (2015) (describing the interplay between enforcement 
strategies and congressional momentum towards more finely-tuned legal regimes); Sachin S. 
Pandya & Peter Siegelman, Underclaiming and Overclaiming, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 836, 
850 (2013) (discussing an enforcement strategy that emphasizes efforts to clarify or overturn 
a legal decision standard). 
230 Several commentators have noted that the Federal Circuit is the primary expositor of 
patent law, and in that way acts more like an agency than an Article III court. See, e.g., 
Burstein, supra note 9, at 1756-57 (“From the perspective of administration, . . . the two most 
salient features of the patent system are its reliance on case-by-case adjudication to resolve 
policy questions in the interstices of the Patent Act and the delegation of that responsibility 
primarily to the courts rather than to an agency.”); Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 
FLA. L. REV. 229, 231-32 (2013) (“By reviewing patent agency decisions heavy-handedly, the 
Federal Circuit has acted like the head of an agency reining in wayward administrative law 
judges.”); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 500-02 (2011) (describing 
the unique stake the Federal Circuit has in decisions regarding patent policy); Ryan Vacca, 
Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 
733 (2011) (arguing that certain Federal Circuit practices are akin to the substantive 
rulemaking undertaken by administrative agencies). 
231 See supra Part II (discussing special review programs the PTO has put into place with 
respect to certain types of patents). 
232 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 846 
(2014); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 120 (2007). 
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for patentable subject matter,233 obviousness under § 103,234 and definiteness of 
claim scope as set forth in § 112.235 
There is no doubt that these cases have critically impacted innovation policy 
in general, and the PTO’s policy in particular. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc. and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International are prime 
examples. In Myriad, the Supreme Court held that isolated DNA sequences fell 
outside the scope of patentable subject matter.236 This was a major shift away 
from the PTO’s long-standing policy of granting patents for such inventions.237 
The Myriad decision, and the PTO’s response to it, has upended the 
biotechnology industry. Beginning only hours after the Court issued the opinion 
in Myriad, the PTO published guidance on how patent-eligibility would be 
assessed, and has provided several different iterations since then.238 
Biotechnology companies have complained about the guidance, claiming that it 
goes beyond what the Court decided in Myriad and is causing the PTO to reject 
biotech patents “left and right.”239 The agency has continued to tweak its 
 
233 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (“We hold that 
the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely 
requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2111, 2114 (2013) (“[W]e hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of 
nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated . . . .”); Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (holding that a process for 
determining proper drug dosage levels did not “transform[] . . . unpatentable natural laws into 
patent-eligible applications of those laws”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010) 
(rejecting for alternative reasons a patent claim for a process used to hedge transaction risk). 
234 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 415-22 (2007) (determining that 
§ 103 was inconsistent with a test for obviousness adopted by the Federal Circuit in the 
proceedings below). 
235 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) (“This 
case . . . concerns the proper reading of [§ 112’s] clarity and precision demand.”). 
236 See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111 (justifying the rejection of the patent claim based on 
prior precedent limiting the granting of patent rights for products of nature). 
237 Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) (“I believe we must be particularly wary of expanding 
the judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and 
extensive property rights are involved.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
238 Jason Rantanen, Myriad: The PTO’s Preliminary Guidance, PATENTLY-O (June 14, 
2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/06/myriad-the-ptos-preliminary-guidance.html 
[https://perma.cc/3L2T-DJLV]. 
239 See Austin Donohue, BIO Submits Comments on “Myriad” PTO Patent Guidance, 
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guidance in response to court decisions and comments from stakeholders, but 
there is still substantial uncertainty in this area.240 
Turning to Alice, the Supreme Court held that the computer-implemented 
method at issue in that case was not patent-eligible subject matter.241 Alice’s 
impact is far reaching, as Judge Moore predicted it would be in the decision 
below.242 Since the Court issued its decision in June 2014, lower courts have 
invalidated numerous software patents.243 And many courts are striking down 
these patents very early in the proceedings (i.e., on a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings) before the court conducts claim 
construction.244 Indeed, some have speculated that Alice and the threat of early 
invalidation are partly responsible for the recent drop in patent litigation.245 Only 
time will tell the full implications of this decision. 
Whatever one thinks about the merits of Myriad and Alice, their significance 
to innovation policy is beyond dispute. Yet, no government agency participated 
in the decision to challenge these patents. Nor were regulators consulted about 
enforcement strategy, at least not in the early stages of the suit.246 
 
240 See John T. Aquino, Attorneys Tell PTO of Patent Eligibility Uncertainty, BLOOMBERG 
L. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.bna.com/attorneys-tell-pto-n17179936061/ 
[https://perma.cc/TF9K-K5TV] (noting the effect of uncertainty as to § 101 eligibility 
determinations on the likelihood that companies will file for patents). 
241 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
242 CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]f all of these claims, including the system claims, are not patent-eligible, this 
case is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial 
system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications 
patents.”), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
243 See, e.g., Brian J. Love, Bad Actors and the Evolution of Patent Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 11 n.42 (2015) (“As of Oct. 20, 2014, 18 courts have directly relied upon Alice in 
deciding whether claims were invalid under § 101 . . . . Of those, 14 decisions invalidated 
claims by applying Alice.” (quoting Brian McCall, Lessons from 4 Months of Post-Alice 
Decisions, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 2014, 10:18 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/590465/lessons-from-4-months-of-post-alice-decisions 
[https://perma.cc/JZN4-NEV9])). 
244 McCall, supra note 243 (presenting figures on judgments rendered at various 
procedural postures). 
245 See PWC STUDY 2015, supra note 188, at 2 (stating that the thirteen percent fall in the 
number of patent lawsuits filed in 2014 was “[d]riven by Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, which 
raised the bar for patentability and enforcement of software patents”); Dennis Crouch, A 
Major Drop in Patent Infringement Litigation?, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/10/patent-infringement-litigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/S9BM-NFAQ] (suggesting that Alice is one factor in the recent decline in 
infringement complaints filed). 
246 The PTO and other agencies are involved in patent litigation, generally through amicus 
briefs or Call for Views of the Solicitor General, but that usually happens when the case is on 
appeal to the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 11, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
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Administrators, who should be the ones setting patent law policy, instead find 
themselves reacting and responding to policies created by private parties and the 
courts. The recent turmoil within our patent system suggests the need for sound 
policymaking, and putting a well-designed public enforcement mechanism in 
place is an important part of that effort. 
C. Patent Validity Challenges and Institutional Choice 
If we need a public patent enforcer, which agency should it be? This Article 
has focused primarily on the PTO and, at the end of the day, I believe the PTO 
is best situated to lead this effort. That said, there are other agencies that operate 
in the patent space—namely the FTC and the DOJ—that deserve 
consideration.247 
1. FTC 
The FTC, which celebrated its 100th anniversary last year, is an independent 
agency with a dual mission of protecting consumers and promoting 
competition.248 Specifically, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTC Act”) proscribes “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”249 The FTC wields various tools to carry out this charge, including 
the power to conduct investigations, initiate enforcement actions, adjudicate 
violations, and educate consumers and businesses about their rights and 
responsibilities.250 Although the FTC’s power is strongest when antitrust laws 
 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) (“The public’s ability to study and use 
native DNA would be unduly compromised if changes caused by the extraction of naturally-
occurring substances from their native environments were sufficient to trigger patent-
eligibility.”). 
247 The ITC also plays an important role in patent law today. The ITC is charged with 
hearing complaints arising under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. See generally U.S. 
INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4105, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2009), 
https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/337_faqs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GCT-4CXH]. Section 337 forbids “[t]he importation into the United 
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation . . . of 
articles that . . . infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent . . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1337 
(2012). In enforcing section 337, the ITC, like federal courts, decides questions of patent 
infringement and validity. However, because the ITC’s jurisdiction and expertise is limited to 
international trade, it would not be the best agency to enforce patent validity. 
248 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/AXR4-J48Q] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
249 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
250 See id. §§ 45(b), 46(a)-(f). 
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are implicated, the definition of unfair trade practices is broad and extends 
beyond the contours of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.251 
In light of the fact that invalid patents hamper competition and harm 
consumers,252 the FTC seems a natural choice for a patent enforcement agency. 
The FTC has played an active role in patent litigation for the past fifteen or so 
years, particularly in the pharmaceutical area.253 For starters, the FTC has 
published multiple studies on the anti-competitive effects of “reverse payment” 
or “pay-for-delay” settlements, whereby branded pharmaceutical companies pay 
generics to keep their drugs off the market.254 More to the point, the FTC has 
been suing firms that enter into these types of agreements since the early 2000s, 
arguing that they unreasonably restrain trade and harm the public by reducing 
the availability of generic drugs.255 While suffering some early setbacks, the 
 
251 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (noting that the FTC may declare 
unfair acts and practices that contravene the underlying purposes of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts); Chuck’s Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (4th Cir. 
1987) (“[T]he FTC Act functions as a kind of penumbra around the federal antitrust 
statutes.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential 
Patents and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 328 (2014) (citing Statement 
of the Federal Trade Commission 1-2, Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121-0081, No. C-
4377 (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschcommissionstatement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EUV8-G6RT]). 
252 See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 779, 801 
(2015) (outlining the negative consequences of invalid patents); Leslie, supra note 93, at 103-
04 (arguing that invalid patents create barriers to entry, engender a fear of litigation, stymie 
consumption and business partnerships, and distort innovation). 
253 See Roundtable Conference with Enforcement Officials, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 
2015, at 1, 22 [hereinafter Roundtable Conference] (statement of Edith Ramirez, 
Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n) (stating that the FTC has been focused on the pay-for-
delay problem “for a very long time”); see also Sherkow, supra note 200, at 220-27 (detailing 
instances in which the FTC has been involved in patent enforcement actions in federal courts). 
254 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1-2 (2010), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-
pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/W74J-N23V]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at i-xi (2002), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3JD-PFMD]. The FTC also 
published a study on the creation of an abbreviated marketing approval pathway for follow-
on biologics similar to the scheme used for pharmaceuticals. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, 




255 See, e.g., Decision and Order, Abbott Labs., No. C-3945 (May 22, 2000), 
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FTC earned a huge victory in 2013 when the Supreme Court decided in FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc.256 that reverse payment settlements are not immune from antitrust 
attack.257 Even after Actavis, the FTC has continued its efforts in this area, for 
example by challenging agreements where the branded company makes a 
noncash payment in exchange for the generic to stay off the market.258 
Though the FTC has focused on pharmaceutical patents and reverse payment 
settlements, it has been involved in other aspects of patent law policy too. With 
the Internet boom came complaints from technology companies about the 
difficulty of identifying and assessing the validity of potentially relevant 
patents.259 In the late 1990s, the FTC held hearings and issued a report 
addressing the relationship among competition, innovation, and patents.260 The 
Commission followed up with a later report concluding that poor quality patents 
can impede innovation.261 These studies made recommendations—such as the 
creation of a post-grant review system—that ultimately became law with the 
AIA.262 Even after the AIA, the FTC’s concern with patent quality has persisted. 
 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/05/c3945.do_.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4DVJ-43H4] (ordering respondent to “cease and desist . . . from being a 
party to any Agreement in which . . . the [New Drug Application] Holder provides anything 
of value to the alleged infringer and the alleged infringer agrees to refrain during part or all 
of the course of the litigation from selling the Drug Product at issue . . . .”); Complaint, 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. 9293 (Mar. 16, 2000), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2000/03/hoechstandrxcomplaint.htm
 [https://perma.cc/C5KC-W7Y3] (asserting that FDA approval of a generic version of a 
cardiovascular drug was “blocked”); Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1061 (Dec. 8, 
2003) (“We have found that the agreements were unreasonable restraints of trade because 
they were likely to cause consumer harm that outweighed any associated pro-consumer 
efficiencies.”).  
256 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
257 Id. at 2227. 
258 See Roundtable Conference, supra note 253, at 22 (discussing the FTC’s case against 
AbbVie, Inc.). 
259 See Mozelle W. Thompson & Susan Stark DeSanti, Foreword, 19 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 857, 859 (2004) (calling attention to 2001 FTC hearings in which consensus was reached 
that reducing the number of “questionable” patents would be beneficial). 
260 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY: COMPETITION 
POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (1996), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/anticipating-21st-century-competition-
policy-new-high-tech-global-marketplace/gc_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NP7-KMZR]. 
261 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-
balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/29G5-
JRXQ] (“Poor patent quality and legal standards and procedures that inadvertently may have 
anticompetitive effects can cause unwarranted market power and can unjustifiably increase 
costs.”). 
262 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 7, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 313 
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In 2015, for instance, the Commission submitted joint comments with DOJ 
regarding the PTO’s Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative, making specific 
recommendations on how to improve the process for granting patents.263 
The FTC has also taken an interest in standard-essential patents (“SEPs”) 
because of their arguably anticompetitive and unfair effects on the market. SEPs 
are patents that have been declared “essential” to implementing some 
technological standard, and therefore must be licensed on fair, reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms.264 In many cases, however, there is a 
dispute between the patent owner and potential licensees about what FRAND 
means.265 The FTC closely monitors SEPs and FRAND-based licensing, which 
potentially eliminate competition between market rivals.266 The FTC has 
likewise weighed in on the topic of “patent hold up”—a situation in which a 
patent owner uses the threat of an injunction as “a club to . . . enhance his 
negotiating stance.”267 The FTC is particularly troubled by this practice arising 
in the SEP context where patent owners have committed to FRAND licenses. 
Just a few years ago, for example, the FTC brought enforcement actions against 
companies that attempted to obtain injunctive relief for infringement of SEPs, 
including Google and its subsidiary, Motorola.268 
 
(2011); see also Symposium, Panel I: Do Overly Broad Patents Lead to Restrictions on 
Innovation and Competition?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 947, 996-97 
(2005) (identifying practical barriers that prevented parties from challenging the validity of 
patents prior to the AIA). 
263 See Aarti Shah & Dionne Lomax, FTC and DOJ: The PTO’s Efforts to Enhance Patent 
Quality Will Promote Competition, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, GLOB. IP MATTERS 
(May 7, 2015), http://www.globalipmatters.com/2015/05/07/ftc-and-doj-the-ptos-efforts-to-
enhance-patent-quality-will-promote-competition-innovation-and-consumer-welfare 
[https://perma.cc/4JFT-FT2X]. See infra Section III.D for further discussion of the PTO’s 
Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative. 
264 See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based 
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 50-52 (2013) (defining SEPs and explaining why 
FRAND-based commitments are instituted by standards-development organizations). 
265 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at 
*1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (determining “reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms for 
a standards-essential patent), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
266 See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standard-Essential Patents and 
Licensing: An Antitrust Enforcement Perspective, Address at the 8th Annual Georgetown 
University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium 4 (Sept. 10, 
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/582451/140915georg
etownlaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C5D-ZRHV] (“Where a licensing agreement harms 
competition by, for example, eliminating close competition between product or technology 
market rivals, or harming the incentives of licensees to develop complementary technologies 
without legitimate justification, the FTC will act.”). 
267 Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974). 
268 Motorola Mobility LLC, 156 F.T.C. 147, 148 (July 23, 2013) (asserting that 
respondents violated FRAND commitments and predicting harm to consumers by way of 
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Last but not least, the FTC has been involved in the debate over PAEs and 
demand letters.269 The FTC indicated initial interest in these topics when it 
published a report in 2011 titled The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent 
Notice and Remedies with Competition.270 The FTC is currently conducting a 
follow-up study “to develop a better understanding of how PAEs may impact 
innovation and competition.”271 In a similar vein, the FTC has focused attention 
on patent owners who send demand letters to large numbers of alleged infringers 
threatening to sue if they are not paid.272 The Commission launched an 
investigation against MPHJ Technology, an infamous patent troll that sent out 
9000 demand letters to small businesses throughout the country for allegedly 
infringing its patent on scanning technology.273 And though unlikely to pass 
anytime soon, legislation has been introduced that would make the FTC’s power 
to regulate demand letters explicit.274 
 
excluding products or raising prices); Robert Bosch GmbH, 155 F.T.C. 713, 719 (Apr. 23, 
2013) (alleging that company’s refusal to license on FRAND terms a patent essential for 
compliance with standards set for refrigerants constitutes a violation of the FTC Act). More 
recently, however, the FTC’s policy on these issues has become muddled. See infra notes 
288-89 and accompanying text. 
269 See, e.g., Press Release, FTC Testifies on Patent Assertion Entities and Legislation to 
Prohibit Deceptive Patent Demand Letters (May 22, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-testifies-patent-assertion-entities-legislation-prohibit 
[https://perma.cc/2PZH-KD7P] (summarizing the agency’s position as conveyed in 
congressional testimony). 
270 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9 (2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-
patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EYD4-58YE] (“Even if PAEs arguably encourage invention, they can deter 
innovation by raising costs and risks without making a technological contribution.”). 
271 Patent Assertion Entities (PAE) Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-assertion-entities-pae-study 
[https://perma.cc/K5NS-N5J3] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016); see also Kristen Osenga, Sticks 
and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses the Complexity of Licensing-Based 
Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001, 1007-08 (2015) (discussing the details of the 
FTC’s current PAE study). 
272 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 
1635-36 (2015) (summarizing the FTC’s investigation of and action against MPHJ 
Technology). 
273 See Joe Mullin, FTC Ends First Case Against a “Patent Troll” with a Slap on the Wrist, 
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 7, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/11/ftc-
ends-first-case-against-a-patent-troll-with-a-slap-on-the-wrist/ [https://perma.cc/EX7N-
84LN] (outlining the case against MPHJ Technology and summarizing the policy climate 
surrounding the issue of patent trolls). 
274 See Gene Quinn & Steve Brachmann, Demand Letter Legislation Must Be Narrowly 
Tailored, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/03/04/demand-letter-legislation-must-be-narrowly-
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In short, the FTC has gained substantial expertise over the past two decades 
that would serve it well as a patent enforcement agency. Where the 
Commission’s efforts in the patent arena were once rebuffed due to lack of 
experience,275 it is now a key player in innovation policy.276 Another factor 
favoring the FTC is that, as an independent agency, it should be more insulated 
from political pressure.277 The decision to challenge a patent (or a class of 
patents) may have serious implications for certain industries, and thus will be 
politically charged. Because the purpose of such enforcement actions would be 
to promote social welfare—much like proceedings under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act—the less outside influence on the decisionmaker, the better.278 Not only is 
the FTC designed to withstand political pressure, but it has also already proven 
a willingness to take some “heat” by confronting major players in both the 
pharmaceutical and high technology sectors regarding their patent practices.279 
Finally, the FTC has deep investigatory and prosecutorial expertise on which it 
could rely if tasked with policing invalid patents. 
Despite its many strengths, there are potential downsides to selecting the FTC 
for this role. First and foremost, the FTC lacks the right type of patent law 
experience. While the Commission has participated in myriad patent litigation 
matters in recent years, it simply does not practice substantive patent law.280 The 
 
tailored/id=55365/ (explaining how the STRONG Patents Act would impact the FTC’s ability 
to successfully sue patent trolls). 
275 See Stephen Nagin, Federal Trade Commission Tries Its Hand at Patent Law with 
Disastrous Results, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Oct. 2002, at 5-6 (opining that the FTC’s failed 
tactics in a patent case demonstrates its “lack of trial skill in patent infringement”); Laura J. 
Robinson, Analysis of Recent Proposals to Reconfigure Hatch-Waxman, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 47, 63 (2003) (remarking that critics blamed the FTC’s failure in a patent infringement case 
on “lack of experience”). 
276 See, e.g., Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
233, 289 (2014) (“[T]he FTC issued authoritative reports in 2003 and 2011 analyzing 
innovation policy . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Kali N. Murray, The Cooperation of Many 
Minds: Domestic Patent Reform in a Heterogeneous Regime, 48 IDEA 289, 313-14 (2008) 
(“Congress has recently strengthened the FTC’s ‘expertise’ role in patent law.”). 
277 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(stating that independent agencies are designed to be insulated from political oversight); see 
also William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade Commission as an 
Independent Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085, 
2086-87 (2015) (explaining that the FTC’s commissioners have “fixed, seven-year terms and 
that a commissioner could be removed during his or her term only for cause”). 
278 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency 
Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) (discussing political pressures on agency 
action). 
279 See supra Section III.C (discussing the FTC’s enforcement actions against Abbott 
Labs, Schering-Plough, and Google, among others). 
280 See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 281, 304 (2011) (stating that the FTC has “little understanding of—or interest in—the 
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FTC is not well versed in doctrines like patentable subject matter, novelty, 
obviousness, and indefiniteness—any of which could be the grounds for an 
invalidity challenge. Its focus, instead, has been on narrow categories of patents: 
pharmaceutical patents that are the subject of reverse payment agreements; SEPs 
that are the subject of requests for injunctive relief; and patents asserted by PAEs 
against a large number of alleged infringers. While the FTC’s efforts with 
respect to these patents are laudable, there are other problematic patents 
threatening consumers. 
The FTC has also been criticized for painting with too broad a brush and not 
appreciating the nuances among industries in how they view, procure, utilize, 
and commercialize patents. The FTC’s approach to standard setting 
organizations (“SSOs”) and patent hold-up is a good example. The 
Telecommunications Industry Association (“TIA”), a leading standards 
organization for wireless technologies, pronounced that it has never received 
complaints about patent hold-up, and believes “the FTC is presuming that 
‘patent hold-up’ is a widespread and fundamental problem, without considering 
the practical experiences of SSOs such as TIA.”281 The American National 
Standards Institute similarly stated that it has received very few reports of patent 
hold-up problems.282 More recently, skeptics—including former FTC 
Commissioner Joshua Wright—claim that the empirical studies conducted so far 
suggest that patent hold-up with SSOs is simply not a systematic problem.283 
This provides a good segue into a discussion of another factor that should give 
pause about the FTC: it is not as politically insulated as one might hope.284 Like 
other independent agencies, the FTC has never been completely isolated from 
the political process.285 But as an agency’s power grows, so does the potential 
 
intricacies of patent law”); John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional 
Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1098 (2011) (“Although the FTC has shown a capacity to 
influence patent-law developments by holding hearings or issuing reports, the FTC has not 
sought to demonstrate expertise in crafting specific patent-law doctrine.” (footnote omitted)). 








283 See Matthew Newman, “Hold-Up” Cases Against Patent Holders Lack “Systematic” 
Economic Evidence, Wright Says, MLEX (June 12, 2015), 
http://mlexmarketinsight.com/editors-picks/hold-up-cases-against-patent-holders-lack-
systematic-economic-evidence-wright-says/ [https://perma.cc/H8J7-49PN]. 
284 See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 277, at 2091 (“The notion that any competition 
agency is so isolated from the political process is a fiction.”). 
285 Id. at 2090 (observing that “independence . . . cannot mean complete isolation from the 
political process” and describing the FTC’s accountability to courts and the public). 
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for political influence.286 Stated otherwise, “[f]eeble public institutions generally 
generally attract tepid interest among politicians.”287 Recent events suggest that, 
as the FTC’s power has expanded, politicians—or the special interest groups 
they represent—may be pressuring the agency to change its ways. 
First, as alluded to above, there has been dissension among the FTC 
Commissioners regarding SEPs, patent hold-up, and injunctive relief.288 This 
debate, which pits the three Democratic Commissioners against the two 
Republicans, was aired publicly last year when the two groups submitted 
competing comments to the ITC on these topics.289 Second, until recently, all of 
the FTC’s reverse settlement suits had been brought on a unanimous, bi-partisan 
basis.290 But the Commission appears split on this issue too, as evidenced by the 
fact that the September 2014 decision to file a complaint against AbbVie, Inc. 
and several other pharmaceutical companies was divided 3-2 along political 
lines.291 Finally, moving beyond patents, there appears to be disagreement 
among the commissioners about the agency’s core powers. More specifically, 
the commissioners sparred over the agency’s authority to police unfair 
competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.292 The Republicans—led by former 
Commissioner Joshua Wright—argued that the FTC should define (i.e., limit) 
the scope of its authority,293 while the Democrats—led by Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez—argued that the FTC’s scope of authority should continue to be 
 
286 Id. at 2091. 
287 Id. at 2091-92. 
288 See, e.g., Darren Tucker, Interview with Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Federal 
Trade Commission, 13 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2014, at 1, 8-9 (quoting Commissioner 
Wright’s disagreement with the FTC’s findings that breaching FRAND commitments and 
increasing royalty rates to FRAND rates violate the Sherman Act). 
289 Leah Nylen, FTC Divide on SEPs Detailed in Comments to Trade Agency, MLEX (July 
24, 2015), http://mlexmarketinsight.com/editors-picks/ftc-divide-on-seps-detailed-in-
comments-to-trade-agency/ [https://perma.cc/F3HN-EQAU]. 
290 See Seth Silber, Jonathan Lutinski & Ryan Maddock, “Good Luck” Post-Actavis: 
Current State of Play on “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2014, 
at 1, 6 (“All prior FTC ‘pay-for-delay’ consents and suits since the late 1990s were brought 
on a bi-partisan basis . . . .”). 
291 Id. 
292 See Michael Macagnone, FTC’s Wright Calls for Vote on New FTC Act Section 5 Rules, 
LAW360 (Feb. 26, 2015, 7:08 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/625831/ftc-s-wright-
calls-for-vote-on-new-ftc-act-section-5-rules [https://perma.cc/U4TY-P3FF] (reporting that 
Commissioner Wright called for the FTC to vote to limit its authority, while Chairwoman 
Ramirez disagreed). 
293 Joshua D. Wright, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Section 5 Revisited: Time for 
the FTC to Define the Scope of its Unfair Methods of Competition Authority, Remarks at the 
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defined by common law.294 And while some consensus was reached on this issue 
in 2015 with the FTC announcing a new policy statement on Section 5, it is 
noteworthy that this policy was not adopted unanimously.295 Republican 
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen dissented because, among other reasons, the 
policy is “exceedingly brief, highly general,” and was adopted without soliciting 
comments from the public.296 
In short, there are pros and cons of charging the FTC with the responsibility 
of policing already-issued patents. But when all is said and done, the FTC does 
not appear to be the best agency to lead this effort. Perhaps the other competition 
agency—the Antitrust Division of the DOJ—would be a better candidate. 
2. DOJ: Antitrust Division 
The DOJ, the federal government’s primary law enforcement agency,297 also 
has some experience with patent law. The DOJ—or, more precisely, the 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ—has inserted itself in the patent arena in much 
the same way as the FTC,298 though to a lesser degree.299 Together with the FTC, 
the DOJ has issued joint guidelines regarding the licensing and acquisition of 
intellectual property,300 and submitted joint comments to the PTO on patent 
quality.301 The DOJ also published a joint report with the PTO supporting the 
FTC’s position regarding injunctions and FRAND-encumbered patents,302 and 
 
294 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at George Washington 
University Law School’s Competition Law Center Regarding Section 5 Enforcement 
Principles 2 (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735411/150813section5spee
ch.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS6P-EUM7]. 
295 Id. (“[A] bipartisan majority of the Commission has adopted a statement of principles 
concerning how we will exercise our standalone Section 5 authority.”). 
296 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen: FTC Act Section 5 
Policy Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,057, 57,058-59 (Sept. 21, 2015). 
297 Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on 
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2000) (“Congress has designated DOJ 
as the litigator for the United States and its administrative agencies.”). 
298 See Christopher R. Leslie, Monopolization Through Patent Theft, 103 GEO. L.J. 47, 63 
(2014) (discussing the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, issued 
jointly by the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division). 
299 See, e.g., Interview with Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 1 (“I should 
first note that the FTC typically takes the lead in antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical 
industry . . . .”). 
300 See supra note 298. 
301 See supra note 262. 
302 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT 
ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND 
COMMITMENTS 8 (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/ 
09/18/290994.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLM3-FC7F]. 
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issued a business letter in 2015 regarding a major SSO’s proposed update to its 
patent policy.303 And though not initially aligning itself with the FTC on reverse 
payment settlements in pharmaceutical cases, the DOJ switched gears with the 
change of administration in 2008.304 Since then, the DOJ has submitted amicus 
briefs and taken other actions to curb the anticompetitive effect of these 
agreements.305 
At times over the past five years, the DOJ has appeared quite committed to 
and invested in patent law matters. Each spring, the Antitrust Division publishes 
an update on its competition advocacy efforts during the previous year. The 2013 
and 2014 reports focused heavily on patent law, noting that intellectual property 
“is a key area for competition policy,”306 and that “[t]he relationship between IP 
rights and competition law remains a central focus for the Division.”307 Reports 
from other years, however, demonstrate that the DOJ cannot always devote so 
much time to patents because other important competition matters (e.g., 
cybersecurity and health care) demand attention.308 
But even assuming the Antitrust Division’s interest in intellectual property 
law remains high, its enforcement power is nevertheless limited. Like the FTC, 
 
303 See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Inst. of Elec. and Elecs. Eng’rs, Inc. (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Letter from Renata B. Hesse] 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/02/311470.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9GPR-FRMC] (notifying SSO that it would not challenge its updated patent 
policy). 
304 See Jacqueline Bell, DOJ Shift on Pay-for-Delay Puts Focus on Courts, LAW360 (Apr. 
14, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/96772/doj-shift-on-pay-for-delay-
puts-focus-on-courts [https://perma.cc/E5PT-ZELT] (reporting that DOJ filed a brief with the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreeing with the FTC’s stance against reverse 
payment settlements). 
305 Competition Advocacy Update 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public-documents/division-update-spring-2013/competition-
advocacy [https://perma.cc/HR4S-JHN2] (“The Division pursues this mission [of competition 
advocacy] through congressional testimony, filing comments and offering counsel to Federal 
and state agencies, engaging in workshops and public speaking, [and] filing amicus 
briefs . . . .”). 
306 Id. 
307 Competition Advocacy Update 2014, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2014/competition-advocacy-update 
[https://perma.cc/SZV2-C8E5] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016). 
308 See Competition Advocacy Update 2012, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public-documents/division-update-spring-2012/competition-
advocacy-update-2012 [https://perma.cc/72MN-CENQ] (stating that 2012 was “especially 
busy” for the Division and that “[o]ne area of particular focus has been health care”); 
Competition Advocacy Update 2011, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 13, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public-documents/division-update-spring-2011/competition-
advocacy-update-2011 [https://perma.cc/A7YT-TF6P] (describing the DOJ’s efforts to 
maintain competition in the health care industry). 
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the Division is a competition agency, not an intellectual property or innovation 
agency; thus, its experience with patents is restricted to their intersection with 
competition law.309 Also like the FTC, the DOJ lacks substantial knowledge of 
substantive patent law—a crucial area of expertise for an agency assigned to 
police patent validity.310 What is worse, the Antitrust Division’s ability to police 
patents is even more constrained than the FTC’s. Whereas the FTC can regulate 
“unfair trade practices” even in the absence of antitrust violations, the DOJ’s 
authority is cabined by the Sherman and Clayton Acts.311 Under current law, 
circumstances where the use of patents amounts to an antitrust violation are 
extremely narrow,312 so the Division’s hands would be tied unless Congress 
expanded its powers. 
Another potential downside of the Antitrust Division—at least as compared 
to the FTC—is that it is not an independent agency. The Division is part of an 
executive branch department, and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust 
serves at the will of the President.313 Thus, the DOJ’s decision to challenge (or 
not to challenge) certain patents may be subject to significant political influence 
from the executive branch.314 Yet, some scholars have argued that this 
assumption about the DOJ is not borne out in reality, pointing out that the 
Antitrust Division has pursued cases in the face of strong opposition from other 
executive branch ministries.315 Myriad provides one such example, where the 
 
309 See, e.g., Letter from Renata B. Hesse, supra note 303, at 1 (stating that the DOJ’s role 
is to “advise the requesting party of the Department’s present antitrust enforcement intentions 
regarding the proposed conduct,” not to “assess whether [the requesting party’s] policy 
choices are right”). 
310 See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
311 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (granting FTC 
authority “to define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice 
does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws”); Matthew Fagin, Frank 
Pasquale & Kim Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance 
Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 451, 550 (2002) (stating that the FTC 
“covers a somewhat broader area of market and consumer concerns” than the DOJ). 
312 See, e.g., Letter from Renata B. Hesse, supra note 303, at 2 (“Think about the IP laws 
and the very narrow ways in which the use of IP can be found to be an antitrust violation. That 
list has been very, very small for a very long time.”); see also Robin C. Feldman, The 
Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 439-43 (2003) 
(describing “Reach-Through Royalties as an example of the insufficiency of testing for patent 
misuse by applying antitrust rules” and stating “the need for clarification on whether Reach-
Through Royalties create antitrust or patent misuse problems”). 
313 See Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 277, at 2100. 
314 See Herz & Devins, supra note 297, at 1352 (discussing failed efforts to make DOJ an 
independent agency). 
315 See, e.g., Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 277, at 2100 (“[T]here are important 
instances in which the Antitrust Division has proceeded with major cases despite the 
vehement opposition of other executive branch ministries.”); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, 
Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality 
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DOJ argued that isolated DNA sequences are not patentable subject matter, 
despite the PTO’s long history of protecting such inventions.316 
Still, for all the reasons that the FTC is not the best agency to police patent 
validity (e.g., focus on competition policy, lack of the right type of expertise) 
the Antitrust Division isn’t either. But what about another division of the DOJ? 
3. DOJ: IP Section 
Another possibility is to put a DOJ division other than antitrust in charge of 
policing patent validity. The obvious choice would be the Intellectual Property 
Section, which is part of the Commercial Litigation Branch within the Civil 
Division.317 The IP Section has relatively broad experience with patent 
matters.318 Its lawyers represent the federal government in infringement actions, 
as well as suits under the Patent Secrecy Act,319 Federal Technology Transfer 
Act,320 and Bayh-Dole Act.321 Aside from litigation, the IP Section also prepares 
and prosecutes patent applications, and represents the government in 
interference proceedings before the PTO.322 
In some ways, the IP Section seems better suited than either the Antitrust 
Division or the FTC to spearhead a patent enforcement effort. First, its focus is 
on intellectual property law (albeit not exclusively patents) rather than 
competition law.323 Second, IP Section lawyers have expertise in relevant patent 
law doctrines, namely patent validity. Not only does patent validity arise as an 
affirmative defense during infringement actions, the IP Section lawyers also 
grapple with validity questions (i.e., novelty, obviousness, patentable subject 
matter, and indefiniteness) when drafting and filing patent applications to secure 
 
Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 64 (2009) (“The Antitrust Division also tends 
to be more immune from political pressure than the FTC.”). 
316 Rai, supra note 1, at 1241 (stating that, in an amicus brief, the DOJ “urged the court to 
reject a decades-old PTO practice of treating almost all DNA as patentable subject matter”). 
317 Intellectual Property Section, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/civil/intellectual-property-section [https://perma.cc/H67H-5WZ5]. 
318 See id. (listing the types of cases and issues IP Section attorneys work on); see also 
Bock, supra note 276, at 291 (“[T]he DOJ . . . [has] personnel who are experienced in 
litigating patent-related issues . . . .”). 
319 See Intellectual Property Section, supra note 317 (“The section defends suits for 
compensation under the Patent Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 183 . . . .”). 
320 Id. (stating that the IP Section “provid[es] assistance and representation to government 
agencies in disputes relating to the ownership and licensing of technology” where the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act or Bayh-Dole Act are implicated). 
321 Id. 
322 Id. (“The IP Section also prepares and prosecutes patent applications for government 
inventors, and represents the United States in patent interference proceedings.”). 
323 In addition to the patent matters mentioned above, the IP Section represents the 
government in copyright and trademark infringement suits, and “defends the Register of 
Copyrights in disputes relating to the registration of works . . . .” Id. 
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protection for government inventions.324 Third, all IP Section attorneys—unlike 
their counterparts in the Antitrust Division or the FTC—have a scientific or 
technical degree and are eligible for admission to practice before the PTO.325 
This means that the IP Section should be well equipped to deal with the complex 
technologies implicated in patent matters. 
What is not clear, however, is whether the IP Section has either the reputation 
or the resources to expand into a full patent enforcement agency. While the IP 
Section has been involved in formulating the government’s position in high 
profile patent cases,326 it has acted behind the scenes and taken a back seat to the 
FTC and Antitrust Division. Because the IP Section lacks a public reputation, 
stakeholders in the patent system may resist this agency playing such an 
important role in shaping innovation policy.327 
Even if the IP Section could overcome this reputational deficit, questions 
about resources remain. The IP Section is one of five sections in the Commercial 
Litigation branch, which is one of six branches within the Civil Division of the 
DOJ.328 Since there are only about 300 lawyers in the Commercial Litigation 
branch, that means relatively few (approximately sixty if they are divided 
equally among the sections) are focused on IP.329 More important than sheer 
numbers is the fact that the IP Section is not its own division, but merely a 
secondary subdivision of the DOJ with less autonomy and decision-making 
 
324 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2135, 2166 (2009) (referring to prosecution and litigation as the “two phases of patent 
validity analysis”). 
325 See Intellectual Property Section, supra note 317 (“[A]ll attorneys assigned to the 
section have a degree in one of the physical sciences or in an engineering field and are eligible 
for admission to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office in patent 
matters.”). 
326 See, e.g., John Fargo, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/john-fargo 
[https://perma.cc/F4VT-36SW] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (describing the involvement of 
John Fargo, Director of the Intellectual Property Staff, in preparing the government’s briefs 
in KSR and Mayo). 
327 See FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 2 (2d ed. 1972) 
(“[E]ach agency must constantly create a climate of acceptance for its activities and negotiate 
alliances with powerful legislative and community groups to sustain its position.”). 
328 Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/civil/civil-division-organization-
chart [https://perma.cc/7VEV-VJVH] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (displaying an 
organizational chart of the divisions governed by the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, 
Civil Division). The six branches in the Civil Division are: Appellate, Commercial Litigation, 
Federal Programs, Immigration Litigation, Consumer Protection, and Torts. Id. The sections 
in the Commercial Litigation branch include Corporate/Financial Litigation, Fraud, National 
Courts, Office of Foreign Litigation, and Intellectual Property. Id. 
329 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHOOSE JUSTICE: GUIDE TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
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power than the Antitrust Division or, certainly, an independent agency like the 
FTC.330 
As our nation’s principal law enforcement agency, there are good reasons why 
the DOJ should be charged with responsibility for policing patent validity. 
Indeed, Ward Bowman contemplated such an arrangement more than forty years 
ago when he recommended legislation that would “mak[e] it possible for the 
Department of Justice to bring an action for patent cancellation on validity 
grounds.”331 Yet, the proposal never warranted serious attention—perhaps 
because the DOJ does not have a division dedicated to patents (or even to 
intellectual property, for that matter). Or maybe the problem is that innovation 
policy is simply not the DOJ’s forte. The PTO, on the other hand, is our premiere 
innovation agency and therefore best positioned to carry out this mission. 
D. PTO as Patent Enforcement Agency 
When thinking about who should implement a proposal related to patents, the 
PTO is the first agency to come to mind. The mission of the PTO, which is 
housed in the Department of Commerce, is to “create the conditions for 
economic growth and opportunity by promoting innovation, entrepreneurship, 
competitiveness, and stewardship.”332 The primary way the PTO fulfills this 
mission is by granting patents and adjudicating validity challenges, but those are 
not the agency’s sole responsibilities. The PTO advises the President, other 
executive agencies, Congress, and the courts on IP policy.333 The agency also 
plays a key role in the international arena, for example by working “to secure 
strong IP provisions in free trade and other international agreements.”334 While 
the obvious choice is not always the best choice, in this case the PTO emerges 
as the frontrunner to lead the effort to police invalid patents. 
 
330 See, e.g., Nuechterlein, supra note 315, at 64 (“Like the Solicitor General, the Antitrust 
Division reports to the Attorney General and enjoys a long tradition of professional 
autonomy.”); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 127 (2009) (“While the degree of autonomy possessed by a specific 
regulator is hard to measure, important dimensions of autonomy include length and security 
of tenure for senior appointments, autonomous funding sources, judicial review standards, 
and the relative political strength of other domestic actors.”). 
331 WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL 254 (1973). 
332 Mission and Organization of the USPTO, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Feb. 19, 
2013), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/mda_01.html [https://perma.cc/FWP8-
W4EY]. 
333 About Us, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/Q6E3-Z23M] (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
334 Id. 
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1. Why the PTO? 
The PTO, first and foremost, possesses the necessary expertise to enforce 
patent validity ex post because of its technological acumen, fluency in 
substantive patent law, and position as a leader in innovation policy.335 
Regulators at the PTO are intimately familiar with patent validity requirements. 
Not only do examiners decide validity questions on a daily basis when granting 
or rejecting patent applications, but the PTO also shapes validity policy by 
pursuing cases or filing amicus briefs in the Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court,336 and then interpreting and issuing guidance on those cases once 
decided.337 Simply put, patent validity is the “bread and butter” of the PTO. 
Another reason the PTO is well suited for this prosecutorial role is because—
as the Supreme Court recently acknowledged—the agency already has some of 
the power it needs to challenge potentially invalid patents.338 It is well 
established that the PTO has the power to institute reexamination proceedings 
sua sponte.339 Although the grounds for reexamination are limited to patents and 
printed publications,340 and PTO guidelines say that sua sponte reexaminations 
should be rare,341 there is some precedent for the PTO policing patents ex post. 
For the most part, the PTO has exercised this power to invalidate “junk” 
patents.342 But in some cases, the PTO has initiated reexamination because of 
 
335 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 37, at 210. 
336 Rai, supra note 1, at 1245 & n.29-30 (observing that the PTO’s policy-shaping 
activities frequently occur through its work with the DOJ’s Office of the Solicitor General). 
337 See Examination Guidance and Training Materials, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
(Sept. 8, 2016, 11:04 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-
policy/examination-guidance-and-training-materials [https://perma.cc/T2QB-E7FD] 
(providing a compilation of PTO guidance documents interpreting statutes, regulations, and 
case law in a number of substantive areas). 
338 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016) (explaining that 
the PTO, on its own initiative, can trigger a reexam). 
339 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012) (providing that the PTO Director may, at any time and on 
his own initiative, “determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by 
patents and publications discovered by him”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2015) (providing that the 
Director may commence an “ex parte reexamination without a request for reexamination” at 
any time during the period of enforceability for a patent). 
340 35 U.S.C. §303(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520. 
341 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2239 (9th ed. 2015) (explaining that a sua sponte reexamination will only occur in 
“compelling circumstances”); Marius Meland, Judge Denies Research in Motion Request for 
Stay of Appeal, LAW360 (Nov. 1, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/technology/articles/217/judge-denies-research-in-motion-request-
for-stay-of-appeal [https://perma.cc/EWU3-AG5G] (stating that there were only 146 director-
ordered reexams between 1981 and 2003). 
342 See, e.g., Director Initiated Order for Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227, 
Control No. 90/006,289 (May 21, 2002), 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/view/BrowsePdfServlet?objectId=DX9LS849REPSPHX&lang=
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pressure from competitors or the public. In NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, 
Ltd.,343 for example, the PTO commenced a director-ordered reexamination344 
after a $53.7 million jury verdict was entered against RIM, the manufacturer of 
the popular BlackBerry device, which resulted in a public outcry.345 Whether it 
was appropriate for the PTO to “flex its enforcement muscles” in these matters 
is beside the point. What’s important is that Congress has already acknowledged 
that the PTO should be enforcing patent validity ex post. 
Moreover, the PTO already has certain mechanisms in place that would 
facilitate these validity challenges. Starting with the Office of the Chief 
Economist (“OCE”), it could prepare economic analyses and dispense other 
advice to ensure the agency’s enforcement decisions are sound.346 Since its 
creation in 2010, the OCE has significantly enhanced the PTO’s policymaking 
abilities.347 The OCE has conducted numerous studies and generated substantial 
data that has allowed (or will allow) the PTO, other agencies, and academics to 
undertake empirical research on patent initiatives.348 The PTO’s Office of the 
Solicitor, which serves as legal counsel to the PTO on intellectual property 
matters, would be instrumental in this effort too.349 The Solicitor’s Office has 
gained extensive patent litigation experience by defending decisions by the 
PTAB (and its pre-AIA predecessor) in federal court, representing the PTO in 
 
DINO [https://perma.cc/8ST7-CGGW] (ordering the reexamination of “all of the claims” of 
an existing patent of a method of swinging on a swing); Director Initiated Order for 
Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 6,007,340, Control No. 90/006,067 (Aug. 28, 2001), 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/view/BrowsePdfServlet?objectId=DXLJ7PCKREPSPHX&lang
=DINO [https://perma.cc/J9BM-RHX8] (ordering the reexamination of an existing patent 
related to a method and system for measuring leadership effectiveness). 
343 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
344 Id. at 1326 (affirming in part, reversing in part, and vacating in part the jury verdict). 
345 See Amy L. Magas, When Politics Interfere with Patent Examination, 4 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 160, 171-72 (2004) (suggesting that the director-ordered ex parte 
reexamination was the result of concerns expressed by several telecommunications 
companies). 
346 See Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/officechiefecon/ [https://perma.cc/MS95-CGMT] (last visited Sept. 
21, 2016) (explaining that the role of the OCE is to advise “the Under Secretary of Commerce 
for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO on the economic implications of policies 
and programs affecting the U.S. intellectual property system”). 
347 See Vacca, supra note 230, at 756 n.128 (stating that the creation of the Office of Chief 
Economist is “step in the right direction” if the PTO is going to set patent policy); Wasserman, 
supra note 6, at 2012 (explaining that the OCE has “had an immediate impact on the [PTO’s] 
decision making”). 
348 See generally Office of the Chief Economist, supra note 346 (providing links to and 
descriptions of recent research, presentations, and articles produced by the OCE). 
349 See Office of the Solicitor, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Jun. 28, 2016, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel/office-solicitor 
[https://perma.cc/77AJ-D4FA] (explaining the duties of the Office of the Solicitor). 
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actions brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and 
preparing amicus briefs in numerous Federal Circuit and Supreme Court 
cases.350 Therefore, the Solicitor could weigh in on litigation strategy and other 
issues that the enforcement arm would face. 
This proposal to monitor patent validity ex post also fits well with the PTO’s 
new Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative (“EPQI”). The goal of the EPQI, which 
was announced in the Federal Register last year, is to “develop[] a new paradigm 
of patent quality at the USPTO.”351 The EPQI is managed by the newly created 
position of Deputy Commissioner for Patent Quality—evidence of the PTO’s 
commitment to improving patent quality.352 There are four new offices that fall 
under the Deputy Commissioner’s purview, including the Office of Patent 
Quality Assurance (“OPQA”).353 OPQA is responsible for assessing and 
measuring patent examination quality at the PTO, a task it accomplishes by 
defining patent quality metrics and performing quality reviews of patent 
examiners’ work product.354 Presumably, OPQA could support and advise the 
PTO’s enforcement arm in much the same way that the OCE and the Office of 
the Solicitor currently do. 
Additionally, the administrative proceedings recently created by the AIA 
provide a convenient and expedient—yet still robust—way to adjudicate these 
validity challenges.355 Before revoking a patent, the PTO must satisfy certain 
 
350 See id. (providing a list of the responsibilities of the Office of the Solicitor and access 
to amicus briefs it has prepared). 
351 Request for Comments on Enhancing Patent Quality, 80 Fed. Reg. 6475, 6475 (Feb. 5, 
2015). 
352 Valencia Martin-Wallace, Valencia-Martin-Wallace, Deputy Commissioner for Patent 
Quality at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), U.S. DEP’T COM.: 
SPOTLIGHT ON COM. (Feb. 24, 2016, 10:04 AM), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/blog/2016/02/spotlight-commerce-valencia-martin-
wallace-deputy-commissioner-patent-quality [https://perma.cc/YF5P-768C] (stating “[a]s the 
Deputy Commissioner for Patent Quality at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office . . . , I lead the Organization’s Enhanced Patent Quality Initiatives . . . .”). 
353 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRESENTATION ON USPTO PATENT QUALITY 
OVERVIEW HOSTED BY NYIPLA AND FORDHAM IP INSTITUTE 4-5 (2015), 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/NYIPLA%20Patent%20Quality%20Eve
nt%207_29_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDA7-XUDX] (presenting a diagram of the 
organizational structure of PTO’s Office of the Commissioner for Patents). The other three 
offices are the Office of Process Improvement, Office of Patent Training, and Office of 
Ombudsman/Stakeholder Outreach. Id. 
354 See Transcript of Patent Quality Chat, Measuring Patent Quality Presentation, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://helix-
1.uspto.gov/player/Transcripts/20150811_PatentQuality_trans.htm [https://perma.cc/VFB6-
ABQ8] (discussing the details of the work product review process). 
355 See Wasserman, supra note 6, at 1976-77 (describing the new post-grant review 
process). While these enforcement proceedings would generally proceed at the PTO, there 
may be times when it’s preferable or necessary to proceed in federal court, which should also 
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procedural requirements. Specifically, Congress was careful to afford parties 
involved in post-grant proceedings a host of protections, including the right to 
discovery, an oral hearing, cross-examination, and appeal.356 Congress also 
determined that the PTAB, a panel of impartial administrative judges with no 
involvement in the initial grant of the patent, would preside over PGR, IPR, and 
CBM proceedings.357 These additional safeguards ensure that patent owners are 
provided the process they deserve, and simultaneously allow the PTO to 
invalidate patents in a streamlined administrative proceeding. 
Last, but certainly not least, granting enforcement power to the PTO will help 
the agency evolve into the nation’s primary innovation policymaker. A 
piecemeal evolution of the agency that began with the AIA, is already 
underway.358 In the past five years, the PTO’s identity and reputation have 
changed. Not only has the agency expanded in size and geographic scope,359 its 
influence is growing as well. For example, the PTAB has significantly 
overhauled the patent landscape by cancelling thousands of invalid claims, 
discouraging some patent owners from pursuing infringement suits, and forcing 
all stakeholders to rethink patent acquisition and litigation strategy.360 What is 
more, the Federal Circuit—and now the Supreme Court—have determined that 
the PTO’s regulations regarding post-grant proceedings warrant judicial 
 
be an option for the government. 
356 See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing the nature of post-grant proceedings under the 
AIA). But see Robert I. Reis, Smoke and Mirrors: America Invents Act 2011: A Chill in the 
Air, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 301, 325-27 (2012) (arguing that the new PTAB proceedings 
may violate both a patent owner’s constitutional right to a jury trial and the separation of 
powers doctrine). 
357 See Ed Silverstein, Proposed Changes to PTAB Trials Could Lengthen the Process, 
INSIDE COUNS. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/04/13/proposed-
changes-to-ptab-trials-could-lengthen-the [https://perma.cc/83E9-UKEN] (reporting an 
intellectual property litigator’s opinion that PTAB judges are “impartial throughout the 
process”). 
358 See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 497 
(2012) (“[T]he America Invents Act requires the USPTO to set standards for the first 
time . . . , pushes it to expedite the review of technologies of national importance, and gives 
it more control over its finances.”). 
359 See Michelle K. Lee, USPTO Regional Offices Forge Ahead in 2016, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF.: DIRECTOR’S F. LEADERSHIP (May 17, 2016, 10:01 AM), 
https://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/uspto_regional_offices_forge_ahead 
[https://perma.cc/2EVH-69K5] (taking note of the opening of the PTO’s Texas Regional 
Office in November 2015, the West Coast Regional Office in October 2015, and the Rocky 
Mountain Regional office in June 2014). 
360 See Amanda Ciccatelli, 3 Years in, Where Do We Stand with Post-Grant Challenges of 
Patents Before the PTAB?, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/02/16/3-years-in-where-do-we-stand-with-post-grant-
chall [https://perma.cc/8KLX-FD2X] (discussing how the PTAB process has removed “from 
the books many patent claims that should never have been granted”). 
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deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.361 Each of these modifications has made the PTO look more and more like 
a typical federal agency. Establishing an enforcement arm within the PTO would 
be an important—perhaps even the final—step in this evolutionary process. 
2. Enforcement Office of the PTO 
Though the PTO is poised to meet this challenge, Congress should explicitly 
grant the agency robust powers to police the validity of already-issued patents.362 
Unlike private parties, who are constrained in post-grant proceedings to 
challenging certain types patents (e.g., only recently-granted patents may be 
challenged in PGR) on certain grounds (e.g., only patents and printed 
publications can invalidate patents in IPR), Congress should permit the PTO to 
challenge any patent—old or new—for failure to meet any validity 
requirement.363 With such broad powers comes flexibility the PTO will need to 
effectively police patent validity. For example, the PTO will have the ability to 
react to changing standards of validity, such as those announced in Myriad and 
Alice. While private parties might abuse this flexibility to harass patent owners 
and promote their self-interest,364 such a result is far less of a concern with 
politically accountable government officials in the PTO.365 
To effectively execute these new powers, Congress should create a separate 
office within the PTO dedicated to this new task of validity enforcement. 
Because the Enforcement Office will engage in litigation, it could be housed 
 
361 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984); see also Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 
2142 (2016) (analyzing the PTO’s IPR regulations promulgated pursuant to the AIA through 
the Chevron framework). 
362 See supra Section II.C.3 (discussing the limitations of PGR, IPR, and CBM as currently 
constituted under the AIA). 
363 I would include failure to disclose the best mode among these requirements. A patent 
applicant must disclose the best mode contemplated for carrying out his invention. See 35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2012). Under the AIA, however, the failure to disclose best mode may no longer 
be the basis for challenging patent validity. See id. § 282(b)(3)(A). One reason Congress 
essentially eliminated the best mode requirement was because it was supposedly over-asserted 
in litigation. See Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 125, 126-27 (2012) (observing that both the “realities of the patent system” and 
the structure of foreign patent laws supported eliminating this requirement). But the best mode 
doctrine “plays a critical role in establishing the level of ‘inventiveness’ necessary for a patent 
that the American patent system has long considered optimal.” Id. at 127. Thus, a seemingly 
good compromise would be to allow the PTO to enforce the best mode requirement, even if 
private parties cannot. 
364 See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 157, at 931-34 (discussing how some parties are abusing 
the post-grant review system). 
365 See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985) (“We may 
presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest. A 
private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own 
behalf.” (footnote omitted)). 
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with the Office of the Solicitor in the Office of General Counsel (“OGC”).366 At 
the same time, the Enforcement Office will have to undertake extensive 
investigations and work closely with OCE to identify potentially problematic 
patents and determine which ones to proceed against, so perhaps locating it 
within the Office of Policy and International Affairs makes sense. However, the 
best case scenario would likely be for the Enforcement Office to stand on its 
own and report directly to the Director or Deputy Director of the PTO.367 
Wherever the Enforcement Office is situated, what matters most is that the PTO 
employees resolving validity challenges are insulated from those employees 
prosecuting such challenges.368 
It is important that the Enforcement Office have robust powers to identify 
potentially invalid patents, investigate, and decide whether to pursue 
cancellation proceedings. That said, the PTO should exercise caution and 
restraint in exercising these powers. In other words, as William Robinson 
suggested over a century ago, government-initiated cancellation proceedings 
should be rare.369 But this does not mean cancellation proceedings should only 
be brought in the most extraordinary of circumstances, which is what has 
happened with director-ordered reexam.370 Instead, for the Enforcement Office 
to be effective, it must utilize these powers sparingly and in the right cases. 
So, what are the right cases and how does the PTO identify them? This Article 
does not endeavor to provide a full response to these questions, but offers a few 
suggestions below. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list, as there are no doubt 
other types of patents worthy of cancellation, but I leave that for future study. 
 
366 The Office of General Law, which represents the PTO in non-intellectual property 
matters, and the Office of Enrollment and Discipline, which oversees the regulation of 
attorneys and agents who practice before the PTO, are also within OGC. See Office of the 
General Counsel, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/about-
us/organizational-offices/office-general-counsel [https://perma.cc/RKE7-786Q] (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2016) (listing the three offices within the Office of the General Counsel). 
367 See, e.g., Brian J. Serr, Turning Section 1983’s Protection of Civil Rights into an 
Attractive Nuisance: Extra-Textual Barriers to Municipal Liability Under Monell, 35 GA. L. 
REV. 881, 890 (2001) (discussing the problem of “layers of bureaucracy” and government 
accountability in the context of § 1983 civil rights claims). 
368 See infra Section III.D.4 (discussing the “separation of functions” doctrine). 
369 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 475 (1890) 
(explaining that, at common law, once a patent was granted, it was revocable only when: (1) 
a grant for the same subject matter had been given previously; (2) the grant was procured by 
fraud; or (3) the subject matter could not legally be patented). 
370 See, e.g., Director Initiated Order for Reexamination of U.S. Patent No. 5,838,906, 
Control No. 90/006,831, at 2 (Oct. 30, 2003) 
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/view/BrowsePdfServlet?objectId=DXLS3E0WREPSPHX&lang
=DINO [https://perma.cc/VC4M-GVXY] (concluding that reexam is warranted due to 
extraordinary circumstances). 
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3. Which Patents Should the PTO Pursue? 
When considering this Article’s proposal—whether to grant the government 
the power to police patents ex post—one of the first questions that comes to 
mind is how the PTO would select the patents to challenge. This is an excellent 
question without a simple answer. The PTO cannot seek to cancel every invalid 
patent, nor should it. Instead, like other agencies, the PTO would be entrusted 
with enforcement discretion,371 and would be called upon to make difficult 
decisions based on a number of factors.372 While the exercise of enforcement 
discretion is far from a perfect process,373 there is no reason to believe the PTO 
is less capable of performing this task than other agencies. 
Still, Congress should (and, in fact, must) provide the PTO with guidance on 
which patents to pursue.374 First, the PTO should focus on patents affected by a 
change in the law, like those precipitated by Myriad and Alice. In the wake of 
landmark cases like these, many questions remain. Let’s consider the current 
state of the law post-Alice. Since the Supreme Court handed down this decision 
in 2014, approximately seventy percent of business method and software patents 
challenged in federal district courts have been invalidated.375 Yet, some of these 
patents will survive Alice, so the question is, which ones? The PTO should help 
solve that puzzle by seeking to cancel patents it believes are invalid under Alice, 
particularly where § 101 eligibility is a close call. By selecting those patents, 
and then articulating reasons why the claims are invalid, the PTO will be shaping 
and moving innovation policy as agencies typically use enforcement actions to 
do.376 
 
371 See Price, supra note 228, at 683 (“[C]ourts and executive-branch lawyers have come 
to see prosecutorial discretion as a central constitutional function of the executive branch.”). 
372 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (explaining that enforcement 
decisions “involve[] a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly 
within [the agency’s] expertise”). Those factors include “whether agency resources are best 
spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether 
the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and . . . 
whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.” Id. 
373 See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental 
Laws, 9 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 625, 640 (1994) (“[F]ew areas of the law invest more 
discretion in agency employees or are more hidden from the public’s view and oversight than 
an agency’s enforcement actions.”). 
374 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-75 (2001) (explaining that when 
Congress gives authority to an agency, it must also provide an “intelligible principle” 
directing the agency’s exercise of its authority to avoid nondelegation problems). 
375 Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case” 
(Part I), BILSKIBLOG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-
after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html [https://perma.cc/6R2C-XKD3] 
(finding that, between invalidations in U.S. District Court and at the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, 201 invalidations had occurred out of 287 total decisions). 
376 Price, supra note 228, at 687-88 (calling enforcement discretion an “attractive policy 
tool”). See generally Andrias, supra note 43, at 1039 (explaining that the Executive uses 
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Second, the PTO should take a hard look at patents that are the subject of 
extensive litigation and/or licensing campaigns.377 Because licensing campaigns 
are not publicly known, however, the Enforcement Office would have to hear 
about them from the targets, so it should put a tip line in place for such 
reporting.378 The PTO could also collect information from organizations focused 
on patent-related collective action. Public interest groups, such as EFF or Public 
Knowledge, and private coalitions like Unified Patents,379 would likely serve as 
good resources for the PTO. Furthermore, a recent study indicates that there is a 
trend at the PTAB of patent challengers engaging in collective action, 
particularly with respect to drug and medical patents, among others.380 Such 
trends could provide the PTO with important insight about potentially 
problematic patents. 
Finally, the PTO should confer and collaborate with other agencies to identify 
patents it might wish to pursue. Patents and innovation policy impact the work 
done by many agencies.381 This Article has discussed some of these 
intersections, focusing on the FTC and DOJ.382 But agencies like the National 
Institutes of Health, Environmental Protection Agency, and Federal 
 
enforcement discretion to advance policy goals). 
377 See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 687 (2011) (finding that the most litigated 
patents are more likely to be invalidated upon the conclusion of litigation on the merits than 
patents litigated one time). 
378 Many agencies have tip lines for the public to report potential violations. See Report 
Environmental Violations, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (July 31, 2016), 
http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/report-environmental-violations [https://perma.cc/G594-
NAKU] (providing a page for individuals to report what appear to be possible violations of 
environmental laws and regulations); Submit a Consumer Complaint to the FTC, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc 
[https://perma.cc/35C4-Y2XW] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (providing a portal through 
which individuals can report fraud, identity theft, or unfair business practices, among other 
consumer complaints); Office of the Whistleblower, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-tips.shtml [https://perma.cc/DV2N-LPKH] (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2016) (explaining various methods for submitting a tip to the SEC and 
explaining how to qualify for the Whistleblower Program). 
379 See FAQ, UNIFIED PATS., http://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq/ [https://perma.cc/FL9Z-
WF7Q] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (explaining how the organization operates to deter 
aggressive patent owners). 
380 Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 172, at 66, 74-75 (explaining that, in this 
process, “petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining petitions filed by prior 
defendants”). 
381 See Narechania, supra note 200, at 1485 (“Patent rights and policies collide with 
regulatory goals in contexts as varied as biotechnology, border control, communications, 
environmental protection, and tax.”). 
382 See supra Sections III.C.1, III.C.2 (discussing how the FTC and DOJ monitor certain 
pharmaceutical patents and SEPs because of their anticompetitive effect). 
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Communications Commission—just to name a few—regularly operate in the 
patent space too.383 Interagency cooperation would not only inform and improve 
the PTO’s enforcement decisions, but may further the non-patent agencies’ 
regulatory goals as well.384 
4. Anticipating Critiques 
Critics are likely to advance three arguments against the PTO assuming this 
prosecutorial role, all of which deserve attention when assessing the viability of 
this proposal. The most persuasive, at least at first blush, is that there is an 
inherent conflict in having the same agency that grants patents also trying to 
prove them invalid.385 In actuality, however, it may not be inconsistent at all for 
the PTO to grant a patent and then possibly demonstrate that the same patent is 
invalid a short time later.386 During initial examination, the burden is on the 
examiner to prove that the applicant is not entitled to a patent.387 However, the 
examiner could have been missing a key piece of prior art during examination 
that becomes available in the subsequent enforcement action.388 Or maybe the 
legal standards subsequently changed, so that even though the patent was valid 
when granted, it is no longer valid because of a decision like Myriad or Alice. In 
any event, agencies in other contexts both grant rights and take them away, so 
the PTO would not stand alone in this regard.389 
 
383 Narechania, supra note 200, at 1486 (“Nonpatent agencies thereby wield important—
but inconsistent—influence over the development of the patent regime.”). 
384 See id. at 1487 (observing that interagency cooperation would ensure that patent 
policies are “responsive to outside regulatory programs”); see also Joseph Landau, 
Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 
1190 (2016) (arguing that immigration policy benefits from overlapping authority at both the 
agency and subagency level because it “creat[es] novel opportunities for dialogue and 
enhance[es] the potential for different actors—with their respective interests, perspectives, 
and pedigrees—to influence agency policy”). 
385 See Davis, supra note 175 (discussing former Judge Rader’s remarks about this alleged 
inconsistency in IPRs). 
386 This is somewhat similar to the FDA context where the agency grants approval for a 
drug or medical device, but can withdraw that approval if it discovers new information (e.g., 
the drug has dangerous side effects). See, e.g., Drug Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/ 
Consumers/UCM284393.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8LH-EV2D] (last visited Sept. 22, 2016). 
387 See In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) (finding 
it odd that an individual seeking “a grant of property” from the government in the form of a 
patent does not, in fact, bear the burden of demonstrating an entitlement to that patent). 
388 Perhaps the threat of a later enforcement action will deter the issuance of bad patents 
in the first place because applicants will be more forthcoming with the PTO and examiners 
more willing to reject weak applications. 
389 Several agencies engage in licensing, a type of administrative adjudication, where the 
same agency grants and revokes the license. 5 U.S.C. § 551(9) (2012) (defining “licensing” 
to include “the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, 
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To be sure, many modern agencies are multifunctional with regulatory, 
prosecutorial, and adjudicatory arms. It’s critical in such an agency, however, to 
create barriers between these functions in order to maintain the integrity of the 
agency’s work.390 To this end, the Administrative Procedure Act mandates a 
“separation of functions,” meaning that agency employees involved in an 
investigatory or prosecutorial function are generally prohibited from 
communicating ex parte with agency employees in the adjudicatory function—
i.e., the administrative judges.391 Nor may an investigatory or prosecutorial 
employee be in a position of authority over the administrative judges deciding a 
matter in which the employee is involved.392 While the separation of functions 
doctrine may require some restructuring of the PTO, and particularly the PTAB, 
the details of such a proposal are beyond the scope of this Article. 
A second argument is that the PTO is too weak and too easily captured by 
external interests to effectively carry out these enforcement duties. Critics in this 
camp will claim that the PTO is more concerned with serving patent applicants 
(from whom the agency receives fees) than with invalidating patents causing 
social harms.393 Whether the PTO ever deserved this reputation is hard to say, 
but today’s PTO looks markedly different from past iterations. In recent years, 
the PTO has been emboldened by successfully challenging many Federal Circuit 
decisions, and playing a key role in securing passage of the AIA.394 Further, the 
creation of the PTAB, post-grant proceedings, and the OCE are some additional 
 
limitation, amendment, modification, or conditioning of a license”). Examples include a 
broadcast license from the FCC; an EPA permit to discharge pollutants into the water; and a 
license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build a power plant. See Geraldine F. 
Baldwin, Section 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act: Is a Formal Hearing to 
Demonstrate Compliance Required Before License Revocation or Suspension?, 51 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1436, 1439 n.15 (1983) (providing various examples of federal laws that have 
delegated licensing authority to federal agencies and explaining the nature of that authority). 
390 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 887-93 (2009) (discussing the 
“outward and obsessive concern about the consolidation of power in administrative agencies” 
that has existed since the dawn of the administrative state). 
391 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (providing that “[a]n employee or agent engaged in the performance 
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not . . . participate or 
advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review” subject to certain 
enumerated exceptions). 
392 Id. § 554(d)(2) (providing that, except in limited circumstances, an employee who 
presides at an administrative evidentiary hearing under 5 U.S.C. § 556 may not “be 
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in 
the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency”). 
393 See, e.g., Masur, supra note 9, at 301-02, 312-15 (discussing the possibility of PTO 
capture by special interests, but concluding that the PTO may be less susceptible to capture 
than other similarly situated agencies). 
394 Rai, supra note 1, at 1238-39 (concluding that, as a result of these actions by the PTO, 
it is beginning to be treated “as a full-fledged participant in the institutional debate”). 
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changes that have begun to reshape the PTO’s internal organization, procedures, 
and identity.395 Most recently, the Supreme Court held that the PTO’s rules 
regarding post-grant proceedings are entitled to Chevron deference—a sharp 
departure from the past when the PTO was branded as an agency with no 
substantive rulemaking authority.396 Charging the PTO with responsibility for 
policing already-issued patents would continue this evolution from an inept and 
politically feeble agency,397 to a respected, influential, and trusted institution that 
that is dedicated to fostering innovation policy that promotes the public good.398 
The final critique relates to fees. The contention could be that the fees 
collected by the PTO (applicant fees and maintenance fees) should not be used 
to support the efforts of the enforcement (or prosecutorial) arm of the PTO.399 
The strength of this argument varies depending on the facts of a particular case. 
If, for example, the patent owner withheld relevant prior art during prosecution, 
then there would be nothing unjust about forcing the patent owner to pay for the 
later validity challenge.400 In other circumstances, however, it would be 
inappropriate for patent applicants and owners to foot the bill (e.g., where the 
law changed, as after Myriad and Alice). Because PTO-initiated validity 
challenges will usually serve the social welfare, taxpayers should generally bear 
the cost.401 
 
395 See supra Section II.C.3 (discussing how the PTAB is impacting the PTO’s reputation). 
396 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142-45 (2016) (analyzing the 
PTO’s IPR regulations promulgated pursuant to the AIA through the Chevron framework); 
Chris Walker, Some Thoughts on Chevron and Patent Exceptionalism from Today’s Supreme 
Court Decision in Cuozzo, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 2016), 
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CONCLUSION 
Invalid patents, even if unenforced, are problematic. They dampen 
innovation, hamper competition, and harm consumers. Yet no public agency 
polices patents after they are issued. We rely instead on private parties, despite 
the fact that incentives for private validity challenges are seriously lacking. Even 
with the passage of the AIA and the creation of new and improved administrative 
proceedings, it is not clear that substantially more patents—or the right type of 
patents—are being challenged. The time has come (and arguably is long 
overdue) for a public agency to investigate and enforce patent validity ex post. 
While the FTC and DOJ have some expertise in patent cases, the newly 
invigorated PTO—as our nation’s top innovation agency—stands ready to lead 
this charge. 
 
WIS. L. REV. 1353, 1404 n.254 ( “[A]lthough the PTO is self-funded, taxpayers still subsidize 
the administrative cost of the patent system, since patents also require taxpayer-funded courts 
to administer through adjudging infringement suits.”). 
